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Foreword 
 
Energy supply is not a new strategic challenge. Spreading industrial growth has triggered a high 
rise in energy consumption, which has been particularly disproportionately high in countries with 
extreme growth rates but low production efficiency per capita. This development has contributed to 
further destabilize the sensitive balance of demand and supply between highly industrialized but 
resource-poor recipient countries and the resource-rich supplier countries on which they depend. 
Russia, being one of the lucky resource riches, is – at first glance – in the comfortable position of 
being able to direct the market and choose clients ready and able to pay what Russia wants. The 
global “great energy game” may have helped Russia’s new nomenklatura to leave behind the Yel-
tsin years of economic despair. Putin’s entourage has self-awarely rediscovered geopolitics, based 
on oil/gas give and take – and the Ukraine, Georgia and even faithful Belarus were the first to learn 
about this new Russian approach to its neighbourhood. The European Union was indirectly affected 
because Russia’s blackmail of her neighbours also resulted in minor austerities in the energy supply 
to Western Europe. For the first time the EU became aware of possible negative consequences of 
her 30 percent dependence on Russian supplies. Russia has promised not to attempt supply gambles 
with the West. But will Russia stick to its promises, if it turns to different strategic priorities? Both 
the EU and Russia have to reconsider the premises of their relations in order to find a reliable basis 
for long-term cooperation. Interestingly, with Cheng Jian an author takes a look at the issue, who 
has an outside perspective, but who comes from a country that is as extremely interested in close 
energy relations with Russia as in stable economic relations with Western Europe. The strategic re-
lation between Russia and the European Union, therefore, is also of strategic interest for China. 
Dr Cheng Jian was a visiting research fellow to the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy 
at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) in 2007. Dr Cheng is Professor at the Center for European 
Studies at the East China Normal University in Shanghai (ECNU). His fellowship was made possi-
ble by a generous grant from the European Union and is a part of the bilateral cooperation between 
the IFSH and the ECNU. His paper summarizes the results of six months of research in Hamburg. 
 
Hans J. Giessmann 
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After the Cold War, Russia and the EU made great improvements in their economic ties and politi-
cal contacts. However, differences in ideology, geopolitics and so forth still exist, making the rela-
tionship between Russia and Europe more and more complex and changeable. On the one hand, the 
Western world maintains a policy of containment toward Russia. Moreover, NATO and the Dual 
Eastern Expansion of the EU impose direct pressure on Russia’s traditional sphere of strategic in-
fluence. On the other hand, Russia is recovering from the ruins of the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and actively engaging in military and energy diplomacy, trying to return to great power 
status by way of its own asymmetric advantages in resources. Because of this resource strategy, en-
ergy plays an indispensable role for the evolution process of bilateral relations.  
 
 
1. EU’s Energy Strategies toward Russia 
 
 
Since the beginning of the industrial era most European countries have comprised a majority of the 
world’s energy consumers. But their energy self-sufficiency rate has shown a trend of yearly de-
crease. According to statistics, in 2005 the EU depended on foreign trade for nearly 80% of its oil, 
and 45% and 47% for natural gas and coal respectively. With the gradually declining production in 
North Sea oil and gas and the addition of ten Central and Eastern European countries the EU’s en-
ergy self-sufficiency rate declined further, to around 50%, along with an increasing degree of de-
pendence on foreign trade. If there is no big change in the energy resources structure, the EU’s en-
ergy self-sufficiency rate is estimated to drop to 30% by 2030.1 
Due to the lack of indigenous energy EU countries have to resort to global energy markets, trying 
to protect their energy security through energy cooperation with the Middle East, Norway, Russia 
and the Central Asian region, as well as the African countries. 
 
 
1.1 The Common Energy Strategy of the EU 
 
The European common energy policy started in 1986. In the same year, the EC approved an energy 
policy which laid the legal foundation for the modern European energy policy and also identified 
goals to be reached by the mid-1990s. In December 1995, the European Commission approved the 
“White Paper: An Energy Policy for the European Union”, which described the main goals of the 
EU’s energy policy. These key objectives were limited to “the completion of internal market build-
ing, the protection of energy supply and security based on competition, and the improvement of the 
ecological nature of energy.”2 In 2000, the EU initially approved a new green paper on energy 
strategy which emphasized the necessity of ensuring the energy supply from external sources. In 
2006 the green paper “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” es-
tablished three core objectives for the EU’s future common energy policy: to ensure sustainable 
economic development, energy industries’ competitiveness (disputes exist in the open market), and 
a secure supply of energy to the EU. The above-mentioned policies comprise the foundation for the 
EU’s energy policy and have become a guide for the EU’s common energy diplomacy. 
The EU’s collective energy security is related to its increasing trend of dependence on imported 
energy. The European Commission declared that  
 
The European Union [has] structural weaknesses regarding energy supply, namely Europe’s growing dependence 
on energy, the role of oil as the governing factor in the price of energy and the disappointing results of policies to 
control consumption. Without an active energy policy, the European Union will not be able to free itself from its 
increasing energy dependence…. Security of supply does not seek to maximise energy self-sufficiency or to mini-
mise dependence, but aims to reduce the risks linked to such dependence. Among the objectives to be pursued are 
those balancing between and diversifying the various sources of supply (by product and by geographical region).3 
                                                     
1  China Petrochemical Newspaper, “EU’s Multiple Diplomatic Solution to Energy Worries”, 29 September 2006. 
2  European Commission, “White Paper : An Energy Policy for the European Union,” COM(95) 682, December 1995 
3  European Commission, “Green Paper – Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply,” 
COM(2000) 769, November 2000, p. 2. 
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In its energy policies the EU has always stressed the development of political and economic coop-
eration with energy supplier countries and the signing of relevant bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments. In addition, the EU emphasizes developing and implementing long-term cooperation 
frameworks with the key countries concerning the EU’s energy interests, strengthening the EU’s 
common diplomatic and external economic policy in the area of energy, and establishing and per-
fecting the relevant mechanisms. Still, the countries participating in the development of trans-
European energy infrastructure are not only EU countries. These non-EU countries are able to 
dominate this infrastructure because they control sections of the energy supply lines into the Union. 
Therefore, the EU also places high weight on consolidating relations with these countries.  
Due to the constantly increasing prices of international energy products, in order to ensure the EU’s 
energy securityEuropean energy policy makers have attached great importance to the study of the 
feasibility of changes in energy supply, i.e. whether the EU countries could replace the current ex-
ternal supply sources with internal energy sources by using new energy-saving technologies and 
increasing the production of alternative energy. 
Ensuring the operation of the internal market is directly relevant to the development and perfection 
of the entire EU internal energy market. The governments of EU member-states have to consider 
their common interests and development of the EU internal energy market. At the same time, they 
may make independent decisions regarding national energy priorities policy on different levels. In 
view of the conflicts between the energy policies of some of the EU members and their possible 
negative impact on the common interests and goals of the EU, Brussels stresses the important role 
of the leading institutions in the prevention of these adverse effects. A primary goal is making the 
policies of each country more consistent with those of the EU and gradually achieving policy inte-
gration. All of the EU’s institutions are involved in the process of resolution-making in the field of 
energy, but the party that plays the main role is the European Commission, which is directly re-
sponsible for the development of common energy policies. The Commission is directing the drive 
toward policy coordination and eventual integration. 
The EU has developed comprehensive external policies and external economic measures. It has es-
tablished cooperation frameworks with many countries in the field of energy and keeps in regular 
contact with these countries to maintain a continuous dialogue. Taking energy security interests 
into account, the EU attaches great importance to the implementation of institutional agreements it 
initiated and developed in order to resolve the energy transit issues for the energy supply to the EU 
market. The “European Energy Charter,” launched in 1991 and later renamed the “Energy Char-
ter,” is the best embodiment of this idea. The Charter developed a series of principles in the fields 
of energy trade, transit shipment and investment, aiming at strengthening the energy cooperation 
between Russia and Eastern Europe. Currently, 51 countries have signed the “Energy Charter.” 
China and the USA have become Charter observers. The EU has been promoting the Energy Char-
ter as a legal framework for regional energy market building, with coverage to the Caspian Sea in 
the east, Norway in the north, and the large areas of the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East in the 
south. The Charter has become a bridge that links energy relation between the East and the West. 
In addition, the EU signed the “Energy Community Treaty” with Albania, Croatia and other South-
east European countries in October 2005 in order to promote the liberalization and opening up of 
the national energy markets in these countries as well as to expand the unified EU energy market to 
these neighboring countries. The EU is pleased to see that Norway, as a major energy supplier, and 
Turkey and Ukraine as energy transit countries, are also preparing to join the treaty. 
 
 
1.2 Energy Exchanges between Europe and Russia 
 
As seen above, the EU attaches importance to developing bilateral relations with major oil produc-
ing countries in different regions. In addition to the traditional energy-producing areas of the Mid-
dle East and North Sea regions, the EU is also actively developing relations with Russia and other 
emerging energy exporting countries in Central Asia, with Iran and Libya, and with a number of 
North African countries. The EU also engages in dialogues with the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) in an attempt to make joint-action agreements in order to lower oil 
prices and maintain the stability of the oil market. 
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Of all of these countries, historical, geopolitical and economic complementarities make it an EU 
priority to develop energy trade relations with Russia. In fact, as early as the 1970s the Soviet Un-
ion launched large-scale natural gas contracts with Germany, France, Italy, Austria and other im-
portant European countries. These compensation agreements played a significant role in the promo-
tion of the gas trade between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Western European countries 
first provided pipeline and compression equipment, which the Soviet natural then compensated 
with gas . The energy trade between the Soviet Union and the Western European countries had 
largely made up the shortage of funds and equipment for the Soviet Union in developing and trans-
porting natural gas, promoted the exploration of natural gas resources, and the development of the 
gas industry. Using funds and equipment from the Western European countries, the Soviet Union 
built three gas pipelines to Western Europe and an integrated enterprise for gas extraction and 
processing, which played an important role in the development of the natural gas industry and the 
expansion of natural gas production and transportation capacities. In addition, the expanding en-
ergy trade also increased the Western countries’ economic dependence on the Soviet Union, which 
later generated many contradictions and differences between Europe and the United States on some 
major issues relating to policy toward the Soviet Union. An obvious example is the push to impose 
economic sanctions against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, led by the United States. Due to close 
economic relations with and energy dependence on the Soviet Union, a significant number of 
Western European countries were not brave enough to seriously support the implementation of the 
economic sanctions. After this incident some western scholars began to worry that the Soviet Un-
ion’s energy might “weaken the unity on political, economic and military issues for the United 
States and its allies, which may lead to ‘the splitting of NATO’”4 
After the independence of Russia and the EU enlargement, EU member-states’ dependence on Rus-
sian energy has been greatly strengthened (For data on the EU’s energy dependence on foreign 
trade please see the table below). 
 
The Table of EU’s Sources of Oil Import in 2004 and Their Respective Proportions5 
 
Oil Gas 
Origins  Percentages  Origins  Percentages  
Russia  26  Russia  29  
EU member states  18  EU member states  37  
Middle East  16  Norway  17  
Norway  13  Algeria  13  
America  8  Nigeria  1  
Africa  6  Qatar  1  
Other CISs  3  Others  2  
Others  10    
Total  100  Total  100  
 
According to the data in the “Green Paper – A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy,” issued by the EU in March 2006, the 25 EU member countries had an oil con-
sumption of about 650 million tons in 2005. The EU itself produced about 130 million tons, or 
about one-fifth of its consumption. The oil that the EU imported from Russia accounted for 30% of 
the total. The natural gas consumption of the EU was about 515 billion cubic meters, of which the 
EU member-states Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Denmark provided 46%, and Rus-
sia 25 %. The remaining part was from Norway, North Africa and the Middle East.6 
The British BP oil company entered the Russian oil market as early as 1998, taking over 25% of 
the shares of the Russian Sidanco Oil Company at the expense of 500 million US dollars. On 11 
February 2003, the BP signed agreements with Russia’s two industrial holding companies: “Alpha” 
                                                     
4  Alexander Taylor, “A Soviet Pipeline to the West,” Time Magazine, 16 February 1981.  
5  Tian Fan, “EU seeks for energy security by integration,” China Petrochemical News, 24 February 2005. 
6  European Commission, “Green Paper – A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,” 
COM(2006) 105, March 2006. 
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Group and Access / Renova. According to these agreements, BP would pay 6.75 billion US dollars 
to the two companies, thus forming Russia’s third-largest oil company. BP’s ownership of 50% of 
the shares of this new company created the largest overseas equity investment project in Russia his-
tory. In addition, many large Russian oil and gas companies have already issued a large number of 
energy bonds in Europe, aiming at attracting foreign investment and building gas stations in Europe 
to ensure the stability of the European downstream (demand) market. 
Since the 1990s the EU, as the world’s largest importer of energy, is in increasing demand for en-
ergy. The European Commission estimates that the EU’s energy consumption will show steady 
growth at an average annual rate of 0.4% until 2030. Currently, 50% of the EU’s energy supply is 
imported; oil imports from the Middle East account for 36% of the total. By 2030 the proportion of 
the EU energy imports is expected to rise to 70%, with 90% reliance on oil imports and 70% on 
natural gas imports7. However, the oil and gas reserves in current supplier areas are increasingly 
unable to meet the EU’s growing demand for energy. In order to guarantee the region’s energy se-
curity and sustainable economic development, the EU needs to find a long-term, stable and reliable 
energy supplier. Furthermore, the unstable political situation in the Middle East casts a shadow 
over the region’s oil and gas supply, especially after the United States’ control over Iraq. The US 
shows clear signs of holding control of oil exports in the Middle East, which brings a lot of risks 
for the EU in terms of importing oil from the Middle East. A diversification of energy imports may 
be an important measure to prevent the possible emergence of oil hegemony. Russia, which has an 
abundance of energy and whose energy production accounts for nearly 13% of the world’s total 
output, has naturally become one of the major alternatives for the EU’s energy imports. The EU has 
an urgent need to strengthen EU-Russian energy cooperation in order to ensure its energy supply 
security before 2030.  
As for natural gas supply, most EU countries rely on imports, with the exception of Denmark and 
the United Kingdom. 100% of Belgium, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg Portugal, Spain and Swe-
den’s natural gas is imported. The European Commission estimates that the EU’s demand for natu-
ral gas imports will mount to 198 million tons by 2010 and 431 million tons by 2020, or 53% and 
68% of the EU’s total demand for natural gas respectively. According to signed agreements, by 
2020 the EU’s gas imports from Russia will reach 38%, Norway 34% and Algeria 23%. It can thus 
be said that the EU’s energy dependence on Russia will be continually strengthened. 
 
The Table of Natural Gas Import Trend of the EU’s 27 Members8 
 
 
 
                                                     
7  “Energy dependence is not a one-way street,” Le Figaro, 28 May 2002. 
8  Jeff Piper, “Towards an EU-Russia Energy Partnership”, The EU-Russia Dialogue, www.iea.org/textbase/work/ 
2003/soyuzgaz/proceedings/Piper_slides.pdf [25 January 2008]. 
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Accordingly, in 2000 the leaders of the EU, France, Germany and Britain launched an energy dia-
logue with Russia. In late September of 2000, the European Commission proposed an initiative to 
further develop and expand cooperation with Russia in the field of energy. The initiative was 
named after the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi and called “the Prodi Plan.” 
From October to November 2000, through contacts at different levels, the EU and Russia identified 
five major tasks:  
 
- First, actively promote dialogues between energy production and consumption countries by 
the use of Russian’s ties with OPEC, and discuss the stability and balanced development of the 
world oil market at the beginning of the 21st century.  
- Second, study the issue of expanding Russia’s oil exports to the EU nations.  
- Third, study the possibility of doubling Russia’s natural gas exports to the EU nations.  
- Fourth, begin EU participation in the development of infrastructure in the CIS, including im-
porting oil through the pipelines of the newly independent countries in order to facilitate en-
ergy imports from Russia.  
- Fifth, expand the scale of the EU’s investment and technical support in Russia in order to 
promote the implementation of specific energy plans in Russia.  
  
At the Russian-EU Summit (Paris, 30 October 2000), the energy dialogue was supported. In a joint 
statement after the summit, it was announced that “the Russian Federation and the EU have decided 
to begin regular dialogue in the energy field to promote the establishment of a partnership between 
Russian Federation and the EU...in the energy field. The dialogue will also study all the concerned 
issues in this field, including energy conservation, production and the rationalization of transport 
infrastructure, as well as the possibility of investing in Europe and developing cooperation between 
the energy-producing and consuming countries.”9 
In March 2001, Russia and Europe established four thematic working groups based on the energy 
dialogue. These groups focus on energy policy, the transfer of technology, energy infrastructure, 
investment and energy conservation, and environmental protection issues. Thus far the “Russia and 
Europe Energy Dialogue” has published seven comprehensive energy reports, which reached a se-
ries of agreements on projects to establish and expand Russian gas and oil pipelines; optimize re-
lated laws on energy investment, production and transportation in the Russian Federation; build en-
ergy technology centers; improve efficiency in the use of energy and conduct energy saving tests; 
and establish joint Russian-European energy reserves and a common market. During these dia-
logues, at the London Summit in October 2005, Russia and the EU confirmed the Nordic gas pipe-
line project. In the latest energy dialogue progress report, published in November 2007, it was 
stressed that Russia and Europe would further promote bilateral exchange of information, coordina-
tion of energy policy, share potential economic risks possibly caused by new oil and gas field de-
velopment and construction of pipelines, and further reduce energy trade barriers in order to even-
tually promote “mutual” energy security for Russia and the EU.  
The EU has signed a trade agreement and a Partnership and Cooperation agreement with Russia. 
Articles 65 and 66 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement set out a fairly broad framework 
of energy cooperation, including the development of a common energy policy. It must be pointed 
out that both Russia and the EU have appealed for the development of special bilateral agreements 
at different levels on energy cooperation based on related provisions of the Partnership and Coop-
eration Agreement. The two sides also proposed to establish a common institution that coordinates 
bilateral energy cooperation; as both Russia and Europe believe that this proposal is reasonable, we 
may see such an insitution established in the relatively near future.  
A further EU priority is to improve bilateral relations with some other CIS countries such as Ka-
zakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, as well as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia, be-
cause for the EU, these countries are transit countries for energy transportation.  
                                                     
9  Stanislav Z. Zhiznin, Fundamentals of Energy Diplomacy, 2003, translated by Qiang Xiaoyun, Shi Yajun, Cheng 
Jian et al., International Energy Politics and Diplomacy (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2005), 
p. 135. 
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1.3 The EU’s Predicament toward Russia’s Energy Policy  
 
Russia possesses the world’s largest natural gas reserves and is both an energy producer and a tran-
sit country. It has a model of democracy and national framework similar to Europe’s. These factors, 
combined with the established methods of natural gas trade since the Soviet Union era and the re-
alities of the gas pipeline and distribution systems construction have laid a solid foundation for 
Europe-Russia energy cooperation. For this reason the EU once considered Russia as a “reliable 
energy partner” even under turbulent circumstances in the Middle East.  
Regarding the energy cooperation between Russia and the CIS countries, the EU’s main economic 
interests concentrate on accessing the raw materials base, participating in energy development and 
delivering energy to the EU market in a safe and reliable manner. This not only connects with the 
EU’ s strategy of expanding external sources of energy supply, but also is related to the reduction 
of dependence on the energy supply from Persian Gulf countries, as well as the strategies of pro-
moting diversified external energy sources. In the long run, the development of this kind of coop-
eration between Russia and the CIS countries will strengthen the political stability of the Eurasian 
space and also conform to the long-term interests of the Europeans.  
However, the EU has encountered great difficulties in the formulation and implementation of en-
ergy policy, especially toward Russia:  
On the one hand, the EU countries are Russia’s traditional market for energy exports; they are also 
the providers of Russia’s energy equipment and technology. In addition, the EU has substantial fi-
nancial resources necessary for the modernization of the Russian energy industry. To some extent, 
energy has become the most realistic and most direct carrier of interests connecting Europe and 
Russia.  
On the other hand, the EU countries express grievances about the totalitarian practices imple-
mented since Putin took office, constant worries over Russia’s great-power chauvinism, and serious 
doubts about the Russian government’s practices in expanding its strategic space by the use of en-
ergy diplomacy. EU member-states also worry about Russia’s willingness to cut off oil and gas 
lines to deter neighboring countries. For historical and geopolitical reasons many new EU mem-
bers, especially Poland and Estonia, maintain a vigilant and even hateful mentality towards Russia. 
They see Russia’s actions as a “Russian threat”.  
Since the founding of the EU, the Europe-Russia relation has experienced a transition from moder-
ate to cold; its watershed was the outbreak of the Iraq war in 2003. Before that, the EU’s policies 
toward Russia were mainly based on “Cooperation + Vigilance.” These policies aimed at cultivat-
ing Russia’s sense of identity and connection with European polices, in the hope that through eco-
nomic aid and political dialogues Russia could be integrated into Europe within 10 years . But after 
the outbreak of the Iraq war in 2003, different attitudes towards the war the EU divided Europe into 
“old” and “new” camps,10 and presented the threat of severe internal discord. The new EU mem-
bers were suspicious of Russia, which affected the overall Russia-Europe relation. In the same 
year, after the parliamentary election in Russia and the consolidation of the strong state system of 
presidential control, Russia’s political ideas of “controllable democracy”11 conflicted with the con-
cepts of freedom and democracy promoted by the EU. In addition, Europe and Russia were both 
engaged in heated confrontation over the “Yukos Event” of 2003, in which the Kremlin attempted 
to take control of the large and relatively independent Yukos oil company. Because of these events, 
the EU’s policy toward Russia was converted into “Engagement & Containment,” and the majority 
of EU countries think that Russia needs more time to integrate into Europe.  
The EU has the following concerns in terms of the risks of depending on Russia’s energy: 
  
                                                     
10  Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Centre, 22 January 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 
2003/t01232003_t0122sdfpc.html [14 January 2008]. 
11  The “controllable democracy” refers to ending political chaos and achieving the unity and free-flowing of decrees 
by the application of a mandatory or quasi-mandatory means; establishing national political system centering on the 
power of the President at the expense of weakening democratic system and the implementation of power expansion, 
its essence is to end social chaos caused by radical changes by strengthening state power to achieve national pros-
perity and development. 
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First, the EU is worried that Russia might use energy as a “geopolitical weapon” to achieve its for-
eign policy objectives. European countries always have a fear that one day energy dependence will 
turn into political dependence, thereby affecting the EU’s geopolitical security. Therefore, in view 
of the EU’s high dependence on Russia energy and the political uncertainty in Russia, the possibil-
ity of Russia’s using energy resources as political tools has recently become a hot topic among 
European strategists. Some European analysts have argued that “if a change occurs in Russia’s in-
ternal political situation Russia may use energy as an effective diplomatic and security policy tool, 
because Russia’s energy policy is different from that of the EU, which pursues economic interests. 
It is largely affected by geopolitical and security policy considerations”12. 
In recent years there have been appeals for the “re-nationalization of natural resources” in Russia. 
The Putin government has increased its control of GAZPROM and the Russian state-owned oil and 
gas company ROSNEFT, as well as its control of almost all the pipeline facilities in the former So-
viet Union regions. This conflicts with EU policies that appeal for free competition in the energy 
market to ensure diversified energies and stable energy supply. Therefore, the EU has tried to put 
pressure on Russia, calling on Russia to join the Energy Charter Treaty. The treaty would allow a 
third country to use pipeline facilities in Russian territory and speed up the liberalization of Rus-
sia’s domestic energy enterprises in order to reduce GAZPROM’s control over gas exports. How-
ever, thus far Russia has refused to acceed to the treaty.  
  
Secondly, the EU is worried that Russia’s energy cannot meet EU expectations in terms of produc-
tion, mining and supply capacity. Due to aging equipment and other reasons, Russia has a very low 
efficiency level. For example, the amount of oil used in creating a certain GDP is 2.5 to 5 times 
higher than in the developed countries. Russia has great domestic demand for oil. Exported oil ac-
counts for only 50% of its oil production, while export of natural gas accounts for only 30%. Ac-
cording to estimates by the USA, during the period 2000-2020, Russia will need about 140 billion 
US dollars only to maintain basic operation of its production system. About 14% of the 15,490 km 
gas pipeline network is overdue for replacement, and 80% were in urgent need of maintenance.13 
According to an estimate from “Russia’s Energy Strategies before 2020,” by 2020 Russia will need 
about 480-600 billion US dollars in investment to support its entire energy economy.14  
 
Third, the EU has concerns about Russia’s current investment environment. Although Europe and 
Russia have developed a “European Energy Priority Report,” which appeals for strengthened coop-
eration in the energy field and the assurance of foreign investment in Russia, European investors 
lack confidence in Russian investments due to Russia’s long delay in approving the European En-
ergy Charter Treaty, which includes a commitment to improve the investment environment and 
comply with the rules of the market economy. Other Russian actions have exacerbated this lack of 
trust. For example, Moscow is investigating several major oil companies because of supposed vio-
lations of permit and environmental regulations. Analysts believe this is an attempt to rewrite the 
agreements reached in the 1990s and to increase Russia’s shares in the energy projects. The project 
led by Shell on Sakhalin Island, worth 22 billion dollars, is now closed because Russia is worried 
about ecological destruction, and is also facing the risk of losing its operation license. BP’s multi-
billion dollar project is facing a similar fate. The British Risk Control Group claimed that the Rus-
sian government’s control of oil production has increased from 10% in 2004 to 30% in 2006. The 
Russian government has introduced a draft paper entitled “Foreign investment is of strategic sig-
nificance for national security: Control measures on Russian enterprises” and is ready to prevent 
foreign investors from having access to key sectors including the aerospace industry, railways, nu-
clear energy, mineral exploitation, war material production, and other important industries and in-
                                                     
12  Antje Noetzold, Die Europaeische Strategie zur Energieversorgungssicherheit, (Brussels: European Office of the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Apr 2005). 
13  Sun Xiaoqing, “The Energy Factors in current EU Relations with Russia”, Contemporary International Relations 
vol. 16 no. 2, February 2006. 
14   Stanislav Z. Zhiznin, Fundamentals of Energy Diplomacy, 2003, translated by Qiang Xiaoyun, Shi Yajun, Cheng 
Jian et al., International Energy Politics and Diplomacy (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2005), 
p. 73. 
14 
dustrial sectors. Moscow claims that foreign investors must declare the controlling interests in pur-
chases of strategic enterprises, and the state has the power of veto over the transaction.15 
 
Fourth, the EU’s energy diplomacy toward Russia has also showed obvious political limitations. It 
has dual characteristics: economic interest dictates pragmatism, but the EU also hopes to maintain 
the “European” approach and prompt Russia to accept European values. However, the answers to 
the question of how the EU should position itself in dealing with its strategic partnership with Rus-
sia, energy diplomacy toward Russia and its overall diplomatic goals are very vague. Thus, in han-
dling relations with Russia, the EU seems unable to decide whether to stay in a pragmatic relation-
ship that focuses on interests or have a strategic partnership that involves long-term, mutual eco-
nomic and political trust and benefit, including the prospect of integration. 
 
The EU’s energy diplomacy toward Russia, including energy dialogue and the G8 summit, plays a 
positive role in ensuring Russia’s energy supply to the EU. However, because the EU excluded 
Russia from the Dual Eastern Expansion of NATO and the EU Russia was rather disappointed at 
the EU’s policies because no real commitment had been made. Russia felt compelled to take a 
“road of Russian characteristics.” The EU is now very worried that this road is the “old approach of 
traditional power politics and equilibrium policy,” and that Russia may become a “volatile part-
ner.”16 Given such contradictions, the EU’s energy diplomacy toward Russia wavers between two 
options: one is to consider Russia as an ally of pragmatic interests, and the other is to see Russia as 
a geo-economic and political strategic partner despite some disappointed expectations. This uncer-
tainty of positioning will in turn influence Russia’s policies, urging Russia to pay more attention to 
its own “national interests” and economic security and to abandon a long-term conception of 
Europe-Russia relations. 
Finally, it needs to be emphasized that how the EU handles relations with its new neighbors -- the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and states in Central Asia -- also directly affects the EU’s 
energy supply security. After the Dual Eastern Expansion of NATO and the EU, a power vacuum 
showed up in Europe-Russia and Europe-Asia geopolitical relations. The EU is trying to occupy 
this vacuum, while European policies continue to have impact on the process of democratization in 
Russia. Russia, which is being squeezed in its traditional geopolitical space, is indicating a sense of 
insecurity, particularly since the outbreak of the “Color Revolution” in the CIS countries. Such 
sense of insecurity has generated more strongly anti-Western tides in Russia. However, if EU 
member states have felt that democracy-exporting to Russia is blocked, that Russia’s future is un-
known, or that it is unclear how to deal with Russia in the future, they have never reflected on how 
the dual nature of the EU’s policy toward Russia has played its part in this issue.17 
In fact, although Russia paid a heavy price in pursuit of Westernization, regardless of its national 
situation during the early 1990s, it is still defined as a neither-East-nor -West geopolitical “other-
ness.” From this perspective, the current European energy strategy analysts should reflect on 
Europe’s own policy shortcomings and study what prompted Russia to change rather than simply 
accusing Russia of using its “energy diplomacy” to construct an empire. In terms of the energy de-
mand, the EU countries’ energy dependence on Russia can be roughly divided into three catego-
ries: the first category covers the countries that have more than 50% energy dependence on Russia 
and includes the three Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and other countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Of these countries, the natural gas imports of Estonia, Finland, Latvia 
and Lithuania rely 100% on Russia. Russia’s natural gas accounts for nearly 80% of Czech and 
Greek total domestic natural gas demand. More than 2/3 of Turkey, Austria and Hungary’s natural 
supply relies on Russia. The second category covers the countries that have more than 10% energy 
dependence on Russia, including Germany, France, Italy, Poland, etc. Among them, Russia’s natu-
ral gas exports to Germany and Poland account for 40% of their total demand. One-fourth of Italy 
                                                     
15  “Report by Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko at a Meeting of the Government of the Russian Fed-
eration”, 31 January 2007 , http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/38 [25 January 2008]. 
16  Katrin Bastian and Roland Goetz, Deutsch-russische Beziehungen im europaeischen Kontext, SWP-Discussion Pa-
per (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2005), p. 8-10. 
17  Katrin Bastian and Roland Goetz, Deutsch-russische Beziehungen im europaeischen Kontext, SWP-Discussion Pa-
per (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2005). 
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and France’s natural gas imports rely on Russia. The third category covers the countries that have 
less than 10% energy dependence on Russia, such as Norway, Denmark, Spain, Britain and other 
countries. 
The EU countries have totally different political attitudes towards Russia – which, for historical 
and political reasons, do not always accord with their respective energy dependence on Russia. Al-
though the Central and Eastern European countries can hardly break away from Russia in terms of 
sources of energy, due to grudges formed during the Soviet Union era and the constant geopolitical 
pressure from the East, as well as the pro-US political tendency that was strengthened after inde-
pendence, they have high domestic anti-Russian sentiment. There is significant tension between 
Poland, Estonia and Russia that has even affected the implementation of the EU’s common diplo-
macy and security policies. In contrast Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, which always consider 
energy supply security as vital national interests, have consistently advocated maintaining a dia-
logue with Russia to avoid over-stimulating Russia’s political attitudes. Their current energy de-
pendence on Russia is relatively small, but because they are facing energy depletion in the middle 
and long term as well as the issue of diversification of imports, they choose to pursue a conciliatory 
stance. These differing perspectives and policies strongly affect the EU’s position as a whole to 
hold energy negotiations with Russia.  
Due to these circumstances, the EU has not yet formed a unified energy policy and energy strategy. 
The European Commission called on member states to establish a unified energy strategy, and to 
strengthen this strategy by way of signing contracts with Russia. It also proposed the establishment 
of a unified institution in Europe, which can be used to coordinate EU energy policy. However, on 
the issue of energy the European Commission only in theory acts on behalf of the EU countries. Al-
though German Chancellor Merkel rejected Putin’s special partnership proposal (with Germany) 
when she held the rotating presidency of the EU and stressed that the EU would unify its policies 
toward Russia, no agreements have yet been reached within the EU, neither on the establishment of 
a common energy market nor a common energy strategy toward Russia. Relatively speaking, Rus-
sia’s energy strategy toward the EU has proved to be a success. 
 
 
 
 
2. Russia’s EU Energy Strategy 
 
 
As the successor of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, Russia’s huge oil and gas complex and 
rich oil and gas resources not only play an important role in its national economic life, but also 
provide a strong material foundation for Russia’s energy diplomacy. Under the leadership of Presi-
dent Putin, Russia has taken advantage of its huge oil and gas reserves and its capacity of produc-
tion and export to support its economic recovery and enable Russia to occupy a unique position in 
the international energy situation. In sum, oil and gas resources have become an important means 
to achieve Russian national strategic objectives. 
 
 
2.1 Russia’s Energy Strategy 
 
As early as the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union had replaced OPEC as one of the world’s largest oil 
producers. With the rapid development of large oil fields in Second Baku and the West Siberia, by 
1988 the oil production of the Soviet Union had reached a new record of 568 million tons, with a 
daily output of an unprecedented 11.4 million barrels.18 The managers of the Soviet Union oil in-
dustry doubled the Soviet Union’s oil production by enhancing the production of West Siberian oil 
fields to three times the original output. 
                                                     
18  Clifford G. Gaddy, Barry W. Ickes, “Resource Rents and the Russian Economy”, Eurasian Geography and Eco-
nomics Volume 46, Number 8 / December 2005. 
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After the breakup of the Soviet Union, both in the Yeltsin era and in the new Russia under Presi-
dent Putin, the Russian government places great expectations on the energy industry. The energy 
industry not only provides support such as fuel & power, taxation, foreign exchange and foreign 
capital to the Russian economy, but also stimulates the development of relevant industries. 
Russia has huge potential in energy resources. According to the ranking of proven oil reserves, 
Russia and Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are listed after Saudi Arabia. The esti-
mates indicate that Russia’s proven oil reserves will be 70-100 million tons in just a few years, ac-
counting for 8-13% of the world’s total proven oil reserves. In addition, its annual output remains 
at 3.3-3.4 million tons, ranked among the world’s top three. Russia’s proven natural gas reserves 
and output respectively account for about 38-45% and 25-27%of the world’s total.19 The energy in-
dustry also provides important tax and financial support for the transition of the Russian economy. 
From 2001 to 2005, the various taxes paid by the Russian oil and gas companies accounted for 78% 
of the tax on mineral use, 72% of the consumption tax (mainly the gas sector) and 52% of tariffs 
respectively. The sum total accounts for 1/3 of the Russian federal budget. In the federal budget re-
venues, the proportion of the oil and gas sectors has increased from 21% in 1999 to 32% in 2004.20 
The Russian government is definitely aware of that these rich natural resources could provide a 
strong backing for its re-emergence as a world power. The energy industry, as an important pillar 
for the Russian national economic and social development, still retains 65% of the oil processing 
capacity of the Soviet Union despite heavy losses at the initial phase of the Soviet Union breakup. 
Russia has intensive oil and gas networks in Europe, which possess rich resources. Therefore, it has 
been a key step for presidents from Yeltsin to Putin to formulate an energy strategy as soon as pos-
sible to restore the natural energy industry in an attempt to revive the Russian economy and restore 
Russia’s great power status. 
After the three major changes in 1995, 2000 and 2003, the Russian government finally approved 
“The Energy Development Strategy of The Russian Federation before 2020” in August 2003. This 
strategy identified Russia’s energy development objectives and tasks until 2020; clarified the future 
energy development model; set the development objectives and basic planning of each energy sec-
tor and strategic regions; clarified basic regulatory and supervisory mechanisms for the domestic 
oil and gas industry monopoly and competition; identified a series of supporting policies, including 
taxation, investment, technology and regional development; and stressed Russia’s status and role in 
the world energy market, as well as the principles for international cooperation.21 
Before the Energy Development Strategy was announced, the Russian government and the aca-
demic world had heated discussions on the concepts and other issues contained in the energy strat-
egy. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov pointed out that one priority of Russia’s energy strategy 
was to further expand and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with foreign countries. Under 
this principle, Russian energy diplomacy should have regional and global priorities.22 Stanislav Z. 
Zhiznin, Professor of Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry, indicated in his Fundamentals of Energy Diplomacy that the external energy strategy 
should include the objectives, tasks and priorities, as well as the mechanism of implementation of 
the energy strategy developed in accordance with Russia’s political and economic interests in the 
field of world energy. For the majority of industrialized countries whose energy supply depends on 
imports, energy security firstly involves ensuring constant and sustainable sources of energy import 
under acceptable economic and political conditions. But for a large energy export country like Rus-
sia, the first thing to ensure energy security is, on the one hand, to ensure the stable operation of 
energy production and related industries in order to meet the requirements for national economic 
development and living, and on the other hand, to enhance export potential and competitiveness 
                                                     
19  Stanislav Z. Zhiznin, Fundamentals of Energy Diplomacy, 2003, translated by Qiang Xiaoyun, Shi Yajun, Cheng 
Jian et al., International Energy Politics and Diplomacy (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2005), 
p.11. 
20  Qi Wenhai, “Identity and Contradiction: The Relationship between the Energy Industry and Economic Transition in 
Russia” Journal of World Economics and Politics 12 (2005). 
21  For details please see the website of the Russian Federation Embassy to China at http://www.russia.org.cn/eng/ 
[14 January 2008]. 
22  Zhang Li, “The Russo-Japanese summit: ‘Angarsk-Nakhodka line’ written into the summit joint statement,” Beijing 
Youth Daily, 19 December 2003. 
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and actively maintain and expand Russian shares in the international energy market in order to en-
sure that oil and gas exports play a pillar role in Russia’s economic development.23 The introduc-
tion of “The Energy Development Strategy of The Russian Federation before 2020” drew a satis-
factory conclusion to this heated discussion. The government officials, experts and scholars have 
formed a consensus on energy strategy, agreeing that the energy strategy should present the long-
term guidelines, policies and measures of the national energy sectors. In addition, the document 
specifies the country’s energy objectives, guidelines and tasks and makes relevant policies in ac-
cordance with the political and economic environment at home and abroad, the geo-political and 
development progress of the energy sectors and the adjustment and revision of the national external 
energy export strategies and regional energy policies. The overall objectives of Russia’s external 
energy strategies include: protecting the energy security of the country by taking into account the 
nation’s external economic and geopolitical interests; strengthening Russia’s status in the interna-
tional energy market; and supporting equal participation in international energy cooperation 
through foreign policy means.24 
In the Energy Development Strategy, the Russian government mapped out its plans for the devel-
opment of the Russian energy industry over the next 20 years. It expects the demand for energy be-
fore 2020 to increase 25-37% over 2000 and GNP to increase 1.2-1.8 times in the same period. 
Therefore, it plans to enhance the development of backup resources reserves to stabilize exports, 
increase Russia’s energy exports to 35% by 2020; increase the energy industry revenue by 50%, the 
state budget revenues by 20%, and GDP by 70% by 2010.25 
Russia will explore energy export channels in the North, East and South to increase the proportions 
of these areas in the geopolitical structure of its energy exports. Currently, Europe is Russia’s main 
market. It must strengthen constructive energy dialogues with European countries so as to play an 
active role in promoting industrial growth in the EU countries, which in turn will lead to its own 
economic development. In the Asia-Pacific region, Russia’s main energy cooperation partners are 
China, South Korea, Japan and India, which are the main markets for Russian oil and gas, electric 
power, nuclear power and nuclear technology products. Since the end of 2003, and especially the 
development of the oil and gas industry since 2004, the Russian government has made big adjust-
ments to its energy (oil and gas) regulations and policies, as well as to the development directions 
of the oil and gas industry. These adjustments are mainly reflected in the shifts in oil and gas pro-
duction and export objectives, as well as the changes to the pipeline infrastructure constructions 
and oil and gas development plans in new regions (in particular, the far east region in East Siberia), 
including: 
 
1. In 2003-2004, Russian oil production and export levels increased significantly. In 2005 oil pro-
duction reached a new record of 470 million tons, close to the highest target of 2010 in “The En-
ergy Development Strategy of The Russian Federation before 2020.”26 Thus, the Russian govern-
ment has made adjustments to the development goals before 2008. 
 
2. East Siberia and the Far East region are the major areas for Russia’s oil output growth in the fu-
ture. However, currently the oil output in these regions is limited. The future trend of growth 
mainly depends on the investment policies and development plans of the Russian government, par-
ticularly the actual investment and construction for infrastructure. In the future, if the eastern region 
cannot increase the output as planned, then the increases in overall Russian oil production will be 
unsustainable. The East Siberia - Pacific oil pipeline system agreed at the end of 2004 was a sig-
nificant adjustment on the development plan for the eastern region. 
                                                     
23  Stanislav Z. Zhiznin, Fundamentals of Energy Diplomacy, 2003, translated by Qiang Xiaoyun, Shi Yajun, Cheng 
Jian et al., International Energy Politics and Diplomacy (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2005), p. 
71-85. 
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25  Распоряжение правительство Российской Федерацииот 28 августа 2003 г. № 1234-р:Энергетическая 
стратегия Россиина период до 2020 года. 
26  Sino-Russia Economy and Trade Website, “Russia’s Oil Output increased by 2.5% in 2005”, 6 January 2006, 
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3. Gazprom27 is Russia’s monopoly on natural gas production and transmission. Gazprom was des-
ignated by the government as a coordinator of gas planning in the eastern region. Gazprom’s gas 
development planning in East Siberia and the Far East region is consistent with Moscow’s inten-
tions. 
 
By studying Russia’s oil and gas strategies and their adjustments and changes, we find: 
 
1. The energy (oil and gas) development strategy formulated by Russia is very clear, comprehen-
sive, systematic, and coordinated. This strategy and its changes not only demonstrate the future de-
velopment direction of the Russian oil and gas industry, but also reflect Russia’s energy security 
concerns and the country’s overall interests. The Russian energy expert S. Zhiznin pointed out that 
Russia had not established a formal energy strategy while he was writing Fundamentals of Energy 
Diplomacy,28 but in recent years, Russia’s oil strategy of “control the upstream, open the down-
stream” domestically and internationally “strive for the Caspian Sea, stabilize Western Europe, 
breakthrough North America and develop the East, and challenge the OPEC” has been gradually 
taking shape.29 This strategy was fully embodied by the Russian government’s handling of the 
Yukos affair and competition with Ukraine and Belarus for oil and gas pipelines and the right of 
pricing.  
 
2. Through adjustments in its energy development strategy the Russian government has increased 
the volume of the oil and gas industry, which highlighted both the current state of development of 
Russian infrastructure and the momentum of the future development. The volume increase also re-
flects the focus on the development of key regions. Russia’s construction proposals for oil and gas 
export pipelines indicate a focus on domestic trunks, extensions, transit routes and the pipelines in 
third countries. These measures will not only greatly enhance Russia’s export capacity but also en-
able the unified oil and gas system to be more flexible. Therefore, Russia lays particular emphasis 
on the pipeline construction of every part being an extension of the unified oil and gas system. 
 
3. Currently, the interests of Russia ‘s central and local governments, state-owned enterprises and 
private enterprises still need to be coordinated. Contests between these parties party have also 
caused inconsistencies in Russia’s energy policies, but based on the unified development of the 
Russian energy industry all of these contradictions will be solved. Take the construction of oil pipe-
lines as an example. Enthusiasm for the construction of pipelines comes from both oil companies 
and oil transportation companies. Although the construction plans and processes of the two parties 
may differ, coordinated development and complementation can still be expected. Of these two ac-
tors, the oil transportation companies represent the government’s vision. As specified in the cur-
rently drafted Gas Long-distance Transmission Pipeline Act: The state owns the trunk line and en-
courages private investment. The investors’ interest could be considered in terms of the cost of 
freight; private investment is encouraged to put into the construction of extension line.30 
 
4. The East Siberia - Pacific oil pipeline system is a major infrastructure construction project for 
the next few years, It has the dual nature of main trunk line and export line. This is in full compli-
ance with the Russian government’s notion of development strategy. It just takes time to determine 
the specific direction of the pipeline and the coordination with interest groups. In addition, Gaz-
prom’s monopoly on the field of transportation cannot be challenged in the short or medium-term. 
The gas pipeline project in the Far East regions it proposed has won strong support from the Rus-
sian government. 
                                                     
27  i.e. The Russian Natural Gas Industry, Co., Ltd, or ‘Gazprom’. 
28  Stanislav Z. Zhiznin, Fundamentals of Energy Diplomacy, 2003, translated by Qiang Xiaoyun, Shi Yajun, Cheng 
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5. According to Russia’s energy resources (oil and gas) development strategy, the total oil and gas 
investment demands before 2020 will be 500-650 billion US dollars. According to its strategic 
planning arrangements and advice from Russian energy strategy experts, 80% of the funds needed 
for the future development could be acquired domestically, but the precondition is that the Russian 
economy continues with smooth development.31 In terms of attracting foreign investment, the Rus-
sian government mainly targets a series of international energy export-oriented projects, and the 
executors include Gazprom as well as other Russian energy enterprises. 
 
It can be said, “The Energy Development Strategy of The Russian Federation before 2020” has 
made clear Russia’s energy strategy and energy policy at the beginning of the 21st century. In the 
development process of this strategy, the Russian government’s price confrontation with OPEC has 
provided a realistic basis and criteria for its introduction. The main concepts of this strategy were 
reflected in Russia’s competitions and cooperation with OPEC, the EU and East Asia thereafter. 
Under the leadership of President Putin, Russia takes advantage of its huge oil and gas reserves as 
well as its capacity of production and export, making them the main supports for its economic re-
covery and boosting itself to a unique position in the international energy situation. Thus, oil and 
gas resources have become an important means to achieve Russian national strategic objectives. By 
looking at the constant adjustments of Russia’s energy policies, it can be seen that the main con-
cepts of the new energy strategy of the Putin Government are: taking energy as a new strategic 
weapon and using energy supply as a lever to control Russia’s traditional sphere of influence; es-
tablishing a new partnership with energy consumption countries through energy cooperation; 
maximizing geopolitical interests through the pursuit of geo-economic interests; and ultimately re-
alizing Russia’s ambitious dream of super-power rejuvenation. 
 
 
2.2 Russia-EU Energy Relations 
 
As a big power across both the Asian and European continents, with the world’s largest land area, 
Russia is more influenced by European civilization. It has always considered itself as a European 
country. As President Putin said, “In terms of spirit, history and culture, Russia is a natural member 
of the European family.”32 From a historical perspective, since the Europe-oriented national devel-
opment vision of Peter the Great in the early 18th century Russia has always taken ”disengage from 
Asia and join Europe” and “ integrate into Europe “ as basic state policy. 
 
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, in order to achieve recovery of the Russian economy Russia 
was in urgent need of political support and economic assistance from the West. Thus the EU be-
came a very important partner in Russia’s foreign trade and international exchanges. The EU is 
Russia’s most important trading partner. Until recently Russia’s foreign trade volume with the EU 
accounted for 40% of the total, a figure that has risen to around 50% with the further eastern ex-
pansion of the EU. In the Russia-EU Summit in Moscow in May 2002, the EU formally recognized 
Russia as a market economy country and signed the final protocol in 2004 for Russia’s accession to 
the WTO, helping Russia take an important step forward towards the door of the WTO. 
 
In 2000, more than half of Russia’s oil exports went to the EU, which accounted for about 16% of 
the EU’s total oil consumption. In November of the same year Russia and Europe signed the “En-
ergy Strategic Partnership Agreement,” which determined the overall plan for energy cooperation. 
In 2001, 17% of the EU’s oil imports were from Russia, valued at 15.4 billion Euros. More impor-
tantly, Russia is also a major natural gas provider to the EU. In 2000, 62% of Russian gas exports 
went to the EU, accounting for 20% of the EU’s total natural gas consumption, while in 2004 the 
figure quickly rose to 29%.33 According to the latest statistics, 30% of the EU’s oil imports and 
                                                     
31  Stanislav Z. Zhiznin, Fundamentals of Energy Diplomacy, 2003, translated by Qiang Xiaoyun, Shi Yajun, Cheng 
Jian et al., International Energy Politics and Diplomacy (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2005), 
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44% of gas imports were from Russia.34 The Russian government also plans to double its natural 
gas exports to the EU in the next 20 years. Therefore, the EU has long considered Russia as its 
largest and most stable gas supplier, while Russia also sees the EU as an important energy diplo-
macy partner, after the former Soviet Union regions. 
 
Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe that newly joined the EU have all been connected to 
the “peace” unified energy system since the early 1990s. The system is closely linked with the uni-
fied energy system of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, these countries also have a common en-
ergy transportation and technology system. At present, the majority of these countries are still Rus-
sia’s huge energy consumers as well as the transit corridors for Russian energy exports to the 
Western European market. In addition, the connection between these countries and the EU has 
changed Russia’s conditions in developing bilateral cooperation with these countries. In this sense, 
relations with the Central and Eastern European countries should become Russia’s diplomatic pri-
orities. Unfortunately, due to various reasons Russia’s relations with the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries happen to be the weakest link in the whole relation between Europe and Russia. 
 
Many Western European countries form a Russian energy sales market. Some of these countries 
are Russia’s main energy equipment suppliers. These countries are also important potential capital 
exporters for Russia’s energy areas. In this light, it is of special importance for Russia to develop 
bilateral cooperation in the energy field with Germany, France, Italy, Britain and other Western 
European countries, as well as to develop cooperation within the Russia-EU framework. A main 
objective of such cooperation would be to promote Russian companies’ entrance into the Western 
European countries’ domestic energy wholesale markets and the development of their retail mar-
kets. Russia should also commit to the development of a long-term energy security strategy with 
the EU countries. In 1995, the Russian-European Energy Security Strategy International Confer-
ence, held in Moscow, identified the overall outline of this strategy. Of course, there are some po-
tential conflicts of interest. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that the EU’s energy pol-
icy calls for the establishment of Eurasian gas transit corridors that bypass Russia, as well as the 
development of directives that impede Russian gas exports. Therefore, the Russian-EU energy dia-
logue launched by the Brussels initiative shows a certain prospect in the search for balance of inter-
ests between Russia and the EU countries. 
In order to expand gas exports to Europe, in 1995 Russia’s Gazprom and Germany, France and It-
aly invested two billion US dollars in the construction of the “Yamal-Europe” mainland gas pipe-
lines that bypass Belarus, Poland and Slovakia through to Western Europe, with an annual trans-
mission capacity of 60 billion cubic meters. In February 2000 Gazprom began laying the only 
transmission trunk road “Blue Stream” that bypasses the Black Sea through to Turkey, which was 
completed and put into operation on 30 December 2002. At the end of 2001 a joint venture pipelie 
construction project between Russia, Bulgaria and Greece also started; by the completion of this 
project, the new pipelines will be able to transmit oil from the Russian Caspian Sea to Europe. In 
November 2002, the construction of a separate gas pipeline—the Nordic gas pipeline—was under-
taken.35 This pipeline is of strategic significance, running from Vyborg through the Baltic Sea to 
the German coast. This route has multiple roles. It can expand the gas supply to the Scandinavian 
countries and also reliably transmit gas to Western Europe, northwest Russia and Kaliningrad. On 
10 June 2002, Russia signed a natural gas pipeline deal with Ukraine and Germany for the joint use 
of gas pipelines. According to this agreement, Russian natural gas can be transported to Western 
Europe through Ukraine. Putin said that energy cooperation between these three countries would 
help enhance European partners’ trust in Russia. Schroeder claimed that Russia’s energy supply is 
extremely important for the European economy; it would be able to greatly reinforce European en-
ergy security. In addition, since 1997 Russia has been the main gas provider to Turkey. Nearly 70% 
of Turkey’s natural gas imports are from Russia. The Russian government expects to increase natu-
ral gas exports to Turkey in the next 20 years. 
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In 2001 at the Brussels Summit, President of the Russian Federation Putin, General Secretary of the 
European Council and High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier 
Solana and President of the European Commission Romano Prodi again issued a statement on en-
ergy, recognizing Russia as the closest, reliable and major energy exporter of the EU, while the de-
velopment of the EU’s internal market will also create a large, integrated energy market for Russia. 
The two sides reached a consensus on the future direction of development and cooperation. The EU 
will help Russia improve its legislation on energy production and transportation as well as help 
with a series of new transportation infrastructure projects, while Russia will guarantee, under legal 
bindings, a long-term supply of fuel and energy. 
In May 2002 the Russia-Europe Summit signed an “Energy Cooperation Statement,” stressing that 
Russia “has special rights of access to the European energy market.” In June of the same year, Rus-
sia signed an agreement with Ukraine and Germany on the joint use of natural gas pipelines, which 
ensures that Russia’s natural gas will be constantly shipped to Europe bypassing Ukraine. In No-
vember of the same year, Russia began construction on a separate natural gas pipeline – the Nordic 
gas pipeline. Starting from St. Petersburg, Russia, continuing through northern Germany and end-
ing at the British eastern coastal areas, it facilitates the supply of natural gas to the Russian north-
west, the European countries and the United Kingdom. 
In Russia’s energy policy and diplomacy, ecology, investment and technology are of great signifi-
cance to the international interests of the Russian energy industry. In view of the important role of 
ecological factors in the Russian and international energy industry, the ecological position of Rus-
sia in its energy policy can also play a role as an external economic factor affecting national strate-
gic interests. “Russia’s Energy Strategy” established the principle of acceptable ecology. Accord-
ing to this principle, the adverse environmental impacts of energy development should not be in-
creased. The attendant problem is that Russia must fulfill its international obligations in ecological 
areas, including the “UN Convention On Cross-border Long-distance Air Pollution,” its Memoran-
dum, “the United Nations Convention on Global Climate Change “ and the “ Kyoto Protocol.” Yet 
engaging in foreign trade business in accordance with the “Kyoto Protocol” provisions (cooperative 
execution and the flexible mechanisms on the sale of greenhouse gas emissions quotas) can only 
partially meet the financial resources needed for the modernization of Russia’s energy industry. 
Energy-saving policies are directly related to Russia’s interest in the world’s energy field and Rus-
sia’s huge potential for energy benefits. According to the “Energy Strategy,” achieving the energy 
potential requires energy consumption to be reduced by 40-48% before 2020 so that Russian oil 
and gas exports could be enhanced without the expansion of production. 
 
The Russian energy industry needs large-scale investment, according to the “energy strategy” esti-
mate. As discussed above, domestic investment will be able to account for 80% of the costs of 
modernization only if the Russian economy continues to develop smoothly. In this regard, Russia’s 
energy strategy interests are complementary to vigorous attraction of foreign investment; otherwise 
Russia’s development in energy sectors and the modernization process will be very difficult. There-
fore, a series of large-scale international energy export-oriented projects are of extremely important 
significance. In addition, Russian companies’ participation in commercial activities in the field of 
international energy would expand its presence in investment business in some countries, which 
will also require corresponding diplomatic support. By looking at Russian history, we can see that 
Germany, Britain, France, Italy and other major EU countries are Russia’s main investors. These 
countries are very interested in Russia’s heavy industry, especially the energy industry and machin-
ery manufacturing industry. For instance, in the Sakhalin Island and the Kovytka gas field and 
other projects eligible for foreign capital accession, the Shell Group, Total Oil and Norway compa-
nies have invested large sums of money. 
 
“Russia’s Energy Strategy” proposed a series of measures regarding technical modernization, in-
cluding the introduction of advanced foreign technologies based on maximum use of domestically 
made equipment and technology. In this regard, the “technical” key direction of Russia’s energy 
diplomacy is to guarantee free-flowing access to foreign high-tech; streamline the programs of the 
new technologies; and support equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation in energy 
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technologies. In terms of all the energy technologies and management above-mentioned, Russia has 
to have strong support from the EU. 
 
At present, the biggest problem for Russia-EU energy cooperation is largely due to Russia’s exces-
sive barriers to foreign direct investment. Placing too much emphasis on “economic independence” 
and “avoiding dependence” in foreign economic ties, the Russian government is willing to incur 
debt in its economic recovery efforts rather than attach more importance to establishing a sound le-
gal system and social environment to attract foreign direct investment. Although Russia’s official 
documents mentioned its welcome of foreign direct investment several times, the Russian govern-
ment has not actually created favorable legal and conditions or infrastructure facilities. In five 
years, before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1998, Russia had attracted foreign direct in-
vestment that amounted to less than 100 billion dollars, which was largely due to the government’s 
excessive prevention of foreign capital from directly entering Russian production fields.36 
 
Overall, although Russia’s political relations with the EU have experienced ups and downs, most of 
the time the energy cooperation between the two parties moves in a very good trend. In the next 
decade, despite the constant changes of the EU’s energy policies, along with increasingly fierce 
competition of the oil and gas exports in the Caspian Sea region and Africa, EU-Russia energy in-
terdependence is expected to continue to deepen. Russian Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko even 
predicted that by 2020 nearly 70% of the total demand for natural gas in Europe would be provided 
by Russia.37 With the continued chaotic situation in the Middle East, the increasing reduction in 
North Sea oil and gas production, and the implementation of the EU’s policies for its own diversi-
fied gas import channels, Moscow’s role as a hub will be even more obvious. 
 
 
2.3 The Implementation of Russia’s Energy Strategy toward the EU 
 
Russia tried to accomplish something in the international oil market, but after years of dealing with 
OPEC, Mobil, Exxon and other transnational oil companies, the Kremlin gradually realized that 
Russia is facing a mature oil market that maintains balance through competition from each party. 
Since the domestic oil production capacity is unable to have a decisive impact on the existing oil 
markets and inter-country political situations, Russia’s oil companies must abide by the rules of the 
game. They should be cautious of other countries’ oil diplomacy policies that were developed after 
careful consideration. However, it is difficult to guarantee Russia’s national interests in such an in-
teractive process. 
According to proven reserves, Russia’s oil supply can be maintained for 22-25 years. According to 
forecasted reserves, it will last for 50 years.38 Evidently, unrestricted oil export does not conform to 
Russia’s national interests. Although in 2005 Russian oil production reached a record high of 470 
million tons, close to the highest target for 2010 in “the Russian Energy Development Strategy be-
fore 2020,” this was apparently its limit. Output increased by only 2.5% that year, the minimum 
incease since 1999.39 Some evidence also suggested that the majority of the recent highs in Russian 
oil exploitation simply illustrated that the oil was from the mines that were not exploited during the 
economic decline and chaos of the late 1990s and the remaining oil left in the 1980s after improper 
pumping.40 If there were no new oilfields for extraction, the current oil output in Western Siberia 
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would reach it peak in 2005-2010. This output would be maintained for some time and then gradu-
ally decline.41 
Although the EU currently consumes approximately equal percentages of Russia’s oil and natural 
gas (27% and 24%respectively),42 Russia is facing bottleneck problems on oil exports to the EU. 
European countries recently imposed more stringent requirements on the sulfur content of import 
fuel; as Russian oil generally has high sulfur content this puts a major constraint on the sale of Rus-
sian oil to the European market. Russia consequently has losses each year as high as 20-25 billion 
dollars. Meanwhile, although the European market is mainly controlled by North Sea oil, the 
growth capacity of the North Sea oil has reached its limit. Its control will therefore gradually de-
crease in the future. As Russia’s oil output and exports continue to grow it will be forced to tran-
scend traditional regional markets, because the Western European market is a saturated market (in 
oil demand). The current growth of demand is repressed by high taxes. In terms of exports, Russia 
is facing competition from quality crude in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Sakhalin, East Sibe-
ria and other new oil fields will mainly target China, Japan, India, South Korea and other non-
European markets. 
In the field of natural gas, Russia’s status is as pivotal as Saudi Arabia’s is in the field of oil. 
Across Europe and Asia, with vast gas fields starting from Sakhalin Island through East Siberia, 
Russia has a unique advantage in the field of gas. Russia accounts for 32.6% of the world’s proven 
natural gas reserves, ranking first in the world. According to proven reserves, the supply of Russian 
natural gas can last for about 90 years, and 100 years according to the estimated reserves. Gaz-
prom, the Russian natural gas industry giant, not only has a monopoly on 95% of Russia’s entire 
natural gas production and almost all the natural gas pipelines, but also controls a quarter of the 
world’s gas reserves, far ahead of Iran (15.7%), Qatar (5.8%), Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (4% each). 
 
With the increasing proportion of natural gas consumption in the world, especially in the EU coun-
tries, President Putin was acutely aware of the development potential of natural gas as a clean en-
ergy in the 21st century. He therefore switched his focus from oil to natural gas and started to build 
a huge energy empire centering on natural gas. As compared with the oil market, a gas-pricing 
mechanism has not yet been formed. By virtue of having the world’s largest natural gas distribution 
system, built from the Soviet Union era, Russia has gained a right of speech and decision in the 
still-immature international natural gas market. Moscow can not only influence the world’s gas 
market prices but also penetrate into the gas transmission and distribution networks through the ex-
pansion of natural gas exports, thereby affecting the production of electricity, gas processing, etc. 
According to “Russia’s Energy Development Strategy before 2020” the Russian government plans 
to enhance natural gas exports and implement the diversification of gas products sales and export 
channels. In terms of Russia’s gas diplomacy priorities it is particularly important to maintain a 
stable and reasonable natural gas price in international trade, which requires a long-term natural gas 
supply contract system with the EU countries. In addition, in order to ensure natural gas transit se-
curity Russia participated in gas exploration with its close neighbors43 as well as distant foreign 
countries.44 Russia also entered the sales systems of natural gas importing countries.45 
In the international energy market, the Russian government closely cooperates with Gazprom and 
Rosneft, the major Russian energy companies. The implementation of a series of measures has 
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aroused a high degree of attention from the international community, which frequenly mentions a 
“Putin Energy Empire.” 
In dealing with the European countries, the primary methods of Putin’s diplomatic strategy are ‘di-
vide-and-rule’ and ‘delay for change’. Due to cost considerations and Russia’s relative backward-
ness in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) technology (especially LNG transport ship-building), gas 
transportation pipelines are mainly used for gas transmission. The resulting problems of secure 
supply have increased the geopolitical considerations of natural gas diplomacy. 
First of all, following its diplomatic tradition Russia’s energy diplomacy focuses on the former So-
viet (FSU) regions. This is mainly based on geopolitical considerations. In fact, from Presidents 
Yeltsin to Putin Russia’s leaders have always considered the former Soviet states (the CIS region, 
at least) as Russia’s own sphere of influence. They have never given up establishing a state group 
centering on Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, with a buffer zone of surrounding states. This zone 
would be composed of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia and other former Soviet Islamic repub-
lics. Russia tries to control these countries to varying degrees in order to exclude the influence of 
other countries.46 
Although Russia’s military strength plummeted after the breakup of the USSR, the gas and oil dis-
tribution channels covering the former Soviet republics – which Moscow inherited control over – 
allowed the Russian government to threaten any disobedient counterparts with cutting off its gas or 
oil supply. By doing so, Russia succeeded in maintaining the economic unification of the CIS 
countries and obtained the control and the right to use the majority of the pipelines. Natural gas is 
widely used in CIS countries for power generation and heating. A cutoff of gas supply in the winter 
would not only shut down the industrial production of the CIS countries that use Russian natural 
gas but also greatly harm residential heating. The governments in the former Soviet Union regions 
are thus subject to great pressure from Moscow.  
Russia’s natural gas diplomacy focuses on the EU. Some EU countries, including Germany and 
Austria, carried out large-scale natural gas trade with the former Soviet Union as early as during 
the Cold War. After the independence of Russia and the EU enlargement, the EU countries’ gas 
dependence on Russia was greatly strengthened. In 2000, 62% of Russia’s gas exports went to the 
EU, accounting for 20% of the EU’s total natural gas consumption; this figure had risen to 41% by 
2001.47 The Russian government also plans to double its natural gas exports to the EU over the next 
20 years. The two sides have long considered each other as key energy partners. 
In the energy diplomacy process with the EU, the two sides’ different understandings on some is-
sues -- including democratic values, the rule of law and a number of important political issues -- do 
not seem to hamper mutual rapprochement on issues of common economic interest. In addition, 
Russia is very skilful in the use of the divide-and-rule strategy. Although Putin has meetings with 
EU officials acting as one entity, he still favors one-on-one dealings with the European leaders in 
an attempt to extract good deals from the individual EU member countries. Russia’s huge amount 
of energy reserves, and natural gas in particular, indeed create a lot of problems for the EU in both 
economic and political terms. The EU member-states as a group have been unable to implement a 
common foreign policy and are especially unable to reach agreement on strategies toward Russia.  
However, the Ukraine gas dispute in early 2006 resulted in EU countries’ deep worries about future 
energy security, which forced the EU to introduce a new Energy Green Paper in March 2006. Enti-
tled “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,” the paper attempted 
to accelerate the EU unified market and the development of common energy foreign policy.  
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3. Energy Game between Russia and Europe: Case Studies 
 
 
Energy is not only the source of state power, but more importantly, it has been put at the absolute 
center of the global power distribution and redistribution system.48 Therefore, the energy issue now 
comprises one of the core interests of the major powers. As mainstream IR thinking in the post-
Cold War era has transformed from a zero-sum game to a conflict-competitive paradigm, so are 
Russia-Europe energy relations composed of competition as well as cooperation. The difficulties 
they are facing and the results they have achieved are the results of this non-zero-sum game; the 
future development of the two parties will also depend on mutual understanding and compromise. 
 
 
3.1 Russia-Ukraine Natural Gas Dispute 
 
One of the former Soviet republics, Ukraine has a shortage of energy. Its oil and gas extraction can 
only meet 11% and 25% of domestic demand, respectively. Ukraine has to rely on significant im-
ports to meet its oil and gas consumption demand. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, for geo-
political and historical traditions considerations Russia is Ukraine’s main gas supplier. 85% of 
Ukraine’s oil and 95% of its gas are imported from Russia, at a price much lower than the market 
price. In the past 15 years, the price of the natural gas Russia exported to Ukraine was maintained 
at 50 US dollars per 1,000 cubic meters. Meanwhile, Ukraine is Russia’s major energy pipeline 
transit country. 90% of the oil and 80% of gas that Russia exports to Europe pass through the oil 
and gas pipelines laying in the territory of Ukraine. There are currently five major natural gas pipe-
lines from Russia through Ukraine; three of them are for the export of natural gas to Europe, while 
the other two supply natural gas to Ukraine itself. 
Ukraine is both the main transit country for Russia’s gas supply to its European customers and it-
self a main consumer of natural gas. Ukraine’s annual natural gas consumption is estimated at 80 
billion cubic meters, of which 25 billion cubic meters are from Russia. The remainder passes 
through Russian gas pipelines even though most of it comes from Turkmenistan and other Central 
Asian countries. Therefore, Russia takes considerable initiative in its energy diplomacy with 
Ukraine, implementing a variety of energy diplomacies. 
However, due to Ukraine’s long-term economic depression, it is unable to repay its large energy 
debts. Russia and Ukraine have a long history of arguing on this dispute, Russia seeks to reduce or 
even interrupt oil and gas supply as a means to exert pressure on Ukraine. In turn, Ukraine threat-
ens to cut off the oil and gas pipelines that link Russia to the Europe as a revenge. Ukraine often 
withholds Russia’s transit natural gas without Russian permission and dumps to other countries at a 
resale price, which infuriates the Russian Government. 
In December 2005, Russia and Ukraine had a controversy over the price of natural gas. Gazprom 
required Ukraine to pay 230 US dollars per 1,000 cubic meters, instead of the “internal price” of 50 
US dollars. While Ukraine hoped that the Russian government would increase the price through 
graded adjustments, so as to avoid too much impact on Ukraine’s domestic economy. President 
Putin pointed out that the Russian government and Gazprom could export natural gas to Ukraine in 
the first quarter of 2006 at the 2005 price, with the precondition that Ukraine must sign contracts 
with Russia by 31 December 2005 indicating that the gas would be sold at market prices starting in 
the second quarter of 2006. This proposal was rejected by Ukraine. Russia then cut off the supply 
of natural gas at 10:00 A.M. Moscow time on 1 January 2006. This was a fatal blow to Ukraine, 
which needs large quantities of gas through the cold winter. Ukrainian President Yushchenko im-
mediately responded that Ukraine was willing to purchase natural gas from Russia at a reasonable 
market price starting 1 January.  
 
On 4 January, the presidents of Gazprom Russia and Gazprom Ukraine announced in Moscow that 
Russia and Ukraine had reached an agreement on gas prices, and signed a five-year contract. Ac-
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cording to the contract, Gazprom Russia would sell natural gas to a newly formed “Russia-Ukraine 
Energy” company at a price of 230 US dollars per 1,000 cubic meters. The “Russia-Ukraine En-
ergy” company would mix the natural gas from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and other 
central Asian countries and resell it to Ukraine for 95 US dollars per 1,000 cubic meters. At the 
same time, the gas transit fees for natural gas exported to the EU countries via Ukraine would be 
increased from 1.09 US dollars per 1,000 cubic meters /100 km to 1.6 US dollars. Even this com-
promise adjusted price is still a blow to the depressed Ukranian economy. 
But the crux of the matter lies in the fact that Russia has already imposed market prices in the CIS 
countries and adopted new pricing mechanisms in other countries. If Russia provides gas to 
Ukraine at lower prices than to the European and other world markets – prices even lower than 
Russia’s domestic prices – it does not sound fair. The one exception is Belarus, a strategic partner 
of Russia, which continues to pay 47 US dollars per 1,000 cubic meters.  
The other reason for the controversy, according to many experts, is that Russia cut off the gas sup-
ply to express its dissatisfaction with Ukraine after the outbreak of the “Orange Revolution.” From 
November to December 2004, Ukraine shocked the whole world with the Orange Revolution. Op-
position party leader Yushchenko claimed that the election of the Ukrainian President had been 
fraudulent and launched a large-scale “street fight”, forcing the authorities to re-vote. Later, Yu-
shchenko was elected President. With a political tendency toward the United States and the West 
and an alienated attitude toward Russia, Yuschenko even announced that Ukraine would strive to 
join NATO before the end of 2008. This was undoubtedly a heavy blow to the region’s traditional 
power Russia. After the Orange Revolution occurred in Ukraine, “Color Revolutions” also broke 
out in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and other Soviet Union republics one after another. Russia felt that it 
must use energy as a weapon to warn those countries against trying to break away from Russia’s 
sphere of influence. Coupled with Ukraine’s upcoming parliamentary election in March 2006, Rus-
sia also hoped to put pressure on Ukraine by taking advantage of this opportunity to allow voters to 
think about what kind of representatives should be elected to the Parliament in the cold winter. 
Several days after the crisis Ukraine reached an agreement with Russia and resumed gas supply to 
Ukraine, but the dispute remains a beacon of European countries’ concern for the security of their 
energy supply. Members of the EU have already been victims of Russia–Europe energy conflicts: 
Since 17:00 on 1 January, Austria’s gas imports from Russia have decreased by 18%, Hungary ‘s 
gas imports from Russia via Ukraine reduced by 25%, and Poland’s by 14%. Romania’s gas im-
ports from Russia have slowed down by 5 million cubic meters per day. EU Energy Commissioner 
Andris Piebalgs pointed out that the Russian-Ukrainian energy stalemate highlighted the EU coun-
tries’ fragility in the supply of natural gas. The 2006 G8 Summit was held in St. Petersburg, Russia. 
President Putin hoped to put energy security as the main topic of the summit. However, this crisis 
created by Russia’s Gazprom prompted the Western critics to be more convinced that Russia is not 
eligible to hold the G8 presidency. The European countries may now increasingly tend to not to be-
lieve the guarantees made by the Kremlin. They may also worry that Russia will use other means to 
demonstrate its strength. Although Russia had months of negotiations with Ukraine and Putin is-
sued a warning, business people and government officials still believe Russia was incorrect to in-
crease the price of natural gas by four times in one jump. This will make Europe very hesitant to 
further increase its energy dependence on Russia. Of course, Ukraine, as a gas transit country, 
threatened unauthorized interception of Russia’s natural gas supply to European countries as 
counter strategy to Russia’s cutoff of its natural gas supply. This lead to the expansion of the con-
flict between the two countries, which sparked global concern. 
The development of the situation showed that Russia and Ukraine, which have a myriad of ties to 
each other, are both incapable of defeating the other once for all. In order to prevent an escalation 
of the situation from affecting their international images and long-term interests, the two countries 
eventually chose to maintain the existing gas supply system. 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, many people in Russia’s political arena are very worried 
that losing Ukraine would ruin Russia’s economy. They are also worried that the Ukraine will 
eventually join the EU, thereby forming a coalition that has a tendency of opposing Russia or being 
used by Western countries to fight against Russia. This would pose a serious geopolitical challenge 
to Russia and a direct threat to Russia’s national security. Of course, this fear is largely instigated 
by the western media, including the former national security adviser of the United States Zbigniew 
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Brzezinski.49 He strongly advocated that the United States and its Western allies, if not able to im-
pel Ukraine to become a counter force against Russia, to at least make it a buffer zone between 
Russia and the other European countries. In fact, this worry was later confirmed by the fact that 
Ukraine not only established the “GUUAM” Group in 1997 (Uzbekistan also joined the group in 
1999) which is drifting outside the CIS and in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, but also has been 
trying to maintain a “balanced” foreign policy between Russia and western countries. It has also 
established a special partnership with NATO, which Russia strongly opposes. 
Marching to Europe and seeking integration is Ukraine’s dominant foreign policy approach, which 
strongly conflicts with Russia’s strategic objectives. Under such circumstances, Ukraine’s diplo-
matic direction will remain in a state of confusion. On the one hand, it pursues non-alignment, not 
participating in the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization; on the other hand it is also con-
cerned about becoming a buffer or bridge between the East and the West. As President Qi Ma said: 
“Ukraine does not want to become a buffer, because it isuffocating to try to please two sides at the 
same time. Ukraine does not want to become a bridge either, because if too many people walk on 
the bridge, the bridge will collapse.”50 
Although under the influence of the EU Russia and Ukraine chose to compromise, the battle be-
tween the two sides will not end. Russia’s cutoff of natural gas supply to Ukraine also affected the 
EU’s gas supply, and Ukraine may pass its losses caused by the higher natural gas prices to the EU 
countries, which is unacceptable for the EU. Therefore, diversified sources of energy have become 
the EU’s largest concern. To avoid an impasse on the issue of energy the EU continues to consoli-
date its ties with its main energy partners Russia, Norway, Algeria and other countries, while at the 
same time is making efforts to find a diversified energy supply. Up to now, the EU has signed en-
ergy cooperation agreements with Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other energy suppliers and 
transit countries. In terms of the development of renewable energy and energy-saving technologies, 
the EU has introduced a number of incentive policies, including enhanced financial support for al-
ternative programs. Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and other Nordic coun-
tries have conducted many trials in this regard and have achieved remarkable results. 
The Russia-Ukraine gas crisis seems on the surface to be a commercial dispute between the two 
countries, but it is actually Russia’s efforts to grasp gas pricing power and control over energy 
pipelines, which is part of Russian energy diplomacy. This diplomacy has also exerted great influ-
ence on Europe. The energy crisis objectively sent a warning to Europe: 153,000 km of gas trans-
mission pipelines are under the control of the Russian Government. To mess with Russia would re-
sult in serious consequences. 
 
 
3.2 The Issue of the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
If considering Russia’s initiative in energy diplomacy as a game, then the EU’s efforts in persuad-
ing Russia to join the Energy Charter Treaty can be seen as a clever counter-game.51] On 25 June 
1990, at the European Commission meeting in Dublin, the then-Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lub-
bers proposed the concept of the European Energy Charter, which aims to “help” the economic re-
covery of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Lubbers pointed that the European En-
ergy Charter could play a role as the political and legal basis for East-West cooperation through the 
concept of improving the economy of the East to support economic transition and enhance political 
stability throughout Europe. The best method is “the establishment of an economically active circle 
in the East, starting from the energy sectors.”52 Since then, the use of energy as a breakthrough 
point and establishing energy cooperation institutions has begun to enter the EC’s consideration. 
Such thinking is an inevitable result of the development of the European political and economic 
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situation. The objective of this concept is to consolidate security and stability in the energy area. 
Thus, this concept has gained support from the European Union and all other member states of the 
European Security and Cooperation Organization. 
On 17 December 1991, the majority of the European countries, the EU, Australia, Canada, Turkey, 
the United States and Japan signed the European Energy Charter in The Hague. The European En-
ergy Charter is a political document whose main objective is to create a favorable environment for 
mutually beneficial energy cooperation in the Eurasian space, so as to establish an open energy 
market in the whole of Europe. The subsequent Energy Charter Treaty then transformed the objec-
tives and declarations of the European Energy Charter into legal obligations. 
Negotiations on the Energy Charter Treaty began in January 1992. The difficulties and complexi-
ties involved in the negotiations of this treaty had many causes. First, the countries involved in the 
negotiations had (and still have) different levels of development. Second, most of the countries are 
the members of GATT and the Economic Cooperation and Development Organization, while some 
of the Eastern European and CIS countries are not. Third, not only in the field of energy trade, tran-
sit transmission and investment regulations, but also in many of the basic rules of the market, the 
industrialized countries and the “transitional” countries present different positions. Fourth, the en-
ergy sector is closely linked with other sectors of the economy, which makes it difficult to formu-
late international treaties on this sector only. Fifth, the EU, the United States, Canada, Japan and 
other countries have different positions on the issue of entering the former Soviet Union energy 
market.  
On 17 December 1994, the Energy Charter Treaty and some of the related documents were open 
for signature in Lisbon. The related documents include: The Final Documents of The European En-
ergy Charter Conference, and the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Ecological Issues. 
Considering that many non-European countries participated in the Charter process, the word 
“Europe” in the treaty was deliberately deleted. In 1995, a total of 51 countries and the EU signed 
the Energy Charter Treaty and the related documents. Virtually all European countries, including 
the CIS countries and the Baltic countries, as well as Australia and Japan signed these documents. 
In 1996, Macedonia and Bosnia joined the Energy Charter Treaty. In 1997, Mongolia also submit-
ted an application. 
The EU has been actively advocating and promoting the construction of the Energy Charter Treaty 
due to its significance to the EU.53 
 
First of all, the Energy Charter is one of the important initiatives of the EU in dealing with energy 
crisis and ensuring energy security. 
 
Secondly, the Energy Charter will help the EU in maximally safeguarding its own energy interests. 
The EU takes the European Energy Charter, G8, the International Energy Agency and other inter-
national organizations as energy diplomacy tools to constrain Russia, so as to realize as many of its 
energy interests as possible. 
 
Third, the Energy Charter is a carrier of and channel for the EU’s communication with energy sup-
ply countries. In addition to strengthening energy cooperation with Russia and other suppliers the 
Charter has also actively promoted cooperation with OPEC, which had laid a solid platform for the 
EU to strengthen communication with energy supply countries.54 
 
In the signing of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Final Documents and Protocol, Russia showed 
concerns on the manner of payment, nuclear materials trade and other issues, which was reflected 
in the Chairman’s Statement of the European Energy Charter Conference and the summary of the 
Lisbon meeting. 
The Energy Charter Treaty and its related documents are the products of mutual compromises and 
concessions, reflecting the ways each party has found of balancing its own interests. The main ob-
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jective of the treaty is to establish a legal framework to promote long-term energy cooperation. The 
Energy Cooperation Treaty is a multilateral treaty based on five key components: investment in the 
field of energy; sovereignty over domestic resources; and free access to the energy market, energy 
transit, and the related capital flow of energy investment. The Energy Charter Treaty requires the 
approval of the legislative authority of the participating countries and takes effect 90 days after the 
30th approval letter submitted to the depositary country (Portugal). By April 2002, 45 countries, 
including the 10 CIS countries, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and the 15 EU countries had completed 
the ratification process. In addition, the European Parliament has agreed a formal approval of the 
Energy Charter Treaty and its relevant documents. 
Russia was elected as a representative to participate in follow-up activities within the framework of 
the Energy Charter Treaty. The negotiation over supplementary (investment) terms is of decisive 
significance. The main objective of this provision is to make amendments to the 10th Article of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, which strictly regulates the encouragement and protection of investments 
and investment mechanisms. The essence of these changes is to enable the inviting country to treat 
national and foreign investors equally, or provide other favorable treatments to foreign investors. 
The supplementary provisions require each party to keep records of all the fines imposed on for-
eign investors. From the perspective of encouraging energy investment at the final stage of invest-
ment, Article 10 may play a more important role than the Energy Charter Treaty. 
The energy transit issue is very complicated. It requires the establishment of a universally applica-
ble international legal framework. In this regard, the development of the draft of the Energy Char-
ter Transit Protocol is of great significance. But the negotiations on the supplementary provisions 
and the Transit Protocol were not successful. The Russian delegation actively participated in the 
negotiations. As the process of the Russian Federation Duma’s ratification of the “Energy Charter 
Treaty is complicated, the Russian delegation encountered certain difficulties. 
Russia’s position on the Energy Charter Treaty is that it affects the Russian economy in key areas. 
About half of its foreign trade, the export trade, would be given priority. The main significance of 
Russia’s participation in the Energy Charter Treaty is to establish a broad legal framework for do-
mestic and foreign energy investors, including the regulation of transit transport. 
Before the Energy Charter Treaty came into effect, the majority of the consultation countries, in-
cluding Russia, agreed to temporarily adopt this treaty. In 1996, the Russian-Azerbaijani Caspian 
“early” Oil Transportation Agreement adopted some of the provisions of the Energy Charter 
Treaty. In addition, based on the Treaty the CIS Economic Union Economic Committee signed a 
multilateral agreement on the implementation of common policies on the oil products pipelines 
trunk line transit on 12 April 1996. 
After preparation, the Energy Charter Treaty and its related documents was sent to the Russian 
Federation Council for approval. In 1997, at a hearing held in the Duma, lawmakers made a series 
of suggestions on this treaty. They endorsed the treaty but thought it needed further discussion be-
fore formal approval. In January 2001, another hearing was held. Based on the results of the hear-
ing, the Duma requested the President of the Russian Federation to mandate the Security Council’s 
thorough analysis of the possible geopolitical and economic impact on Russia after the approval of 
the treaty. 
Under the present situation, if the Russian legislative authorities can formally approve the Energy 
Charter Treaty and introduce a series of laws, it would create the necessary conditions for the at-
traction of domestic and foreign investment. Once the Energy Charter Treaty is officially approved, 
it will solidify Russia’s international obligations and be adopted into its national legal system. This 
will be reflected in the competition methods, state procurement system, foreign exchange adjust-
ments and external economic activities, and investment regulations, as well as the national regula-
tions on international arbitration. The approval of the Energy Charter Treaty will largely affect the 
legal basis of the whole economy. 
The provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty will apply to Russia’s relations with other CIS coun-
tries in the energy field, thereby pushing these relationships onto a more civilized track and in par-
ticular helping to solve Russia’s transit issues with Ukraine. In addition, the Treaty will facilitate 
the convergence of Russia’s economic system with the EU’s, reducing obstacles to the entry of EU 
capital and technology into Russia. It is also of positive significance to the enhancement of Rus-
sia’s energy efficiency. From the perspective of the country’s overall interests, the balance of rights 
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and obligations that Russia will obtain in the treaty is positive and useful. After the development of 
supplementary provisions and implementation, Russia will be ready to provide the same treatment 
to national and foreign investors in energy exploration, processing and transport. This will improve 
the investment environment and is expected to attract large-scale foreign investment. Meanwhile, 
Russian companies will be able to enter energy consumption markets and foreign energy equip-
ment markets without discrimination. They will have access to capital markets, which will ensure 
convenient and efficient access to investment from energy and related sectors, particularly favor-
able conditions in Russian energy transit, and so on. 
The Energy Charter Treaty is built on a foundation of national energy market liberalization. The 
signing parties of this Charter must open up their energy markets in various aspects, from produc-
tion to distribution to foreign investment companies. Therefore, as the government’s monopoly is 
broken, the influence of energy-exporting countries in the formulation of energy prices and exports 
will be weakened. Although the Russian government has signed the Energy Charter Treaty, it still 
has the Duma as a hurdle. Of course, the Energy Charter Treaty has not been passed in all EU 
member states, nor in the United States and Canada, which hold divergent views on this issue. This 
divergence has led to the European countries’ inability to form a harmonious view on the energy 
policy issue. In view of these differences, the issue of energy security has become harmful to every 
European country that needs a large amount of foreign energy. Thus, putting pressure on Russia 
and forcing Russia to open up its energy market to European companies has become a common 
purpose of the EU member countries. 
However, whether Russia can ultimately pass the Energy Charter depends on its ability to gain 
preferential access concessions from European countries. Moscow has proposed the opening-up of 
the European energy market to Russia’s Gazprom. The Kremlin rulers have a profound understand-
ing on the importance of energy in their political game with Europe and the world, thus they would 
never give up their oil and gas trump card. Therefore, although the European countries attempt to 
put pressure on Russia in the hope that Moscow will adopt the Energy Charter Treaty immediately, 
all signs indicate that the Russian government will not soon succumb to the pressure of the Euro-
pean governments. At the G8 Summit in July 2006, Putin said, “Some specific issues remain un-
solved in the Energy Charter itself and within the framework of its Additional Protocol ... We need 
to know, in return, what we can get.”55 The delay on the adoption of the Energy Charter Treaty has 
also affected the progress of Europe-Russia energy cooperation. Russia is skeptical about the sup-
plementary and transit provisions, concerned that it might not be able to maintain its gas export 
monopoly to the European. This is the crux of the current problem. 
The Energy Charter Treaty was initiated by the EU member states. The initial objective of the de-
velopment of a framework of documents that put constraints on energy trade was to regulate the 
energy trade between Russia and Europe. This can be seen as an EU effort to convince Russia to 
integrate into the European family. Despite setbacks, the two sides have not cancelled dialogue and 
negotiation. Russia’s Energy Planning by 2020 and the Green Paper passed by the EU in 2006 were 
both aimed at convincing Russia to join the Energy Charter Treaty. It is anticipated that negotia-
tions will continue and Russia will ultimately accede to this treaty, but only in compliance with bi-
lateral interests. 
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4. Conclusion  
 
 
The Russia-Europe energy relationship, despite posturing games in the short term and con-
trol/counter-control competition by both sides, will continue for some time. In the long run, the re-
lationship will center on cooperation and compromise, because the establishment of a positive en-
ergy interaction is a common need for both actors. 
In terms of the decision-making mechanisms of the two sides, Russian mechanisms can be vividly 
described as taking a shape similar to the human body: The head refers to the policy-makers, i.e. 
President Putin and Russia’s top political elites. The body parts comprise Russia’s huge bureau-
cratic institutions, including many departments in the central and local governments, the oligopolis-
tic enterprises’ spokesmen and outside groups within the government. Two of the largest energy 
companies, Gazprom and ROSNEFT56, make up the two arms. The lower part of the body has 
many legs made up of the other financial oligarchies in the energy industry. The problem of the 
whole mechanism lies in that the head, the decision-making organ, is too small while the trunk and 
extremities are too big. It is difficult to keep a balance between hands and feet. Taking into account 
the interests of various parties, the introduction of any energy policy in Russia must go through 
long internal games between various government departments and enterprises. Even in the process 
of implementation problems occur due to various reasons. Therefore, in Russia’s external games 
with western energy companies Russia’s frequent changes of decisions are often caused by the im-
balance of the internal forces rather than a conscious policy alteration by the government or the top 
policy makers. Nevertheless, the head can play the role of arbiter. In this system of body parts, 
President Putin and his aides still make the final decision. Though the head cannot ensure a timely 
response in the right place, it is able to make and implement a final resolution. 
As a regional international organization, the EU common energy policy-making mechanism is a 
very abstract and loose structure. Although common energy diplomacy is nominally coordinated by 
the European Commission and entrusted to the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel 
Barroso for coordination, the specific energy policy is decided by the countries themselves. If also 
using a vivid analogy to describe the case, the EU’s energy decision-making mechanism is like a 
galaxy. The common energy diplomacy center in this galaxy is a very small star with little gravity, 
while the EU member states are the 27 satellites rotating around the star in different directions. One 
can imaging the difficulty of enhancing the gravity of the star and regulating the rotation of the sat-
ellites in this state. 
Because energy concerns their core national interests, most EU countries make their own energy 
policies. Still, the EU has managed to form a preliminary consensus on the development of energy-
saving technologies and new energies, as well as the building of an internal common energy mar-
ket. It has also demonstrated a common diplomatic posture in its energy diplomacy with Russia. 
However, the EU’s energy dependence on Russia will strengthen, at least in the near future. The 
common foreign energy policy is still elusive, as diversified energy supply cannot be guaranteed, in 
particular diversified sources of natural gas, and the development of new energies has failed to 
make substantive progress.57 
The world has entered an era of high energy prices: various factors have determined that the energy 
market will be a seller’s market in the medium and long-terms. As an energy supplier Russia pos-
sesses and has consolidated its advantages in pricing, transportation, supply and many other areas. 
Meanwhile, in Russia-EU energy exchanges, as Russia’s traditional energy consumer as well as 
technology and funds provider, the EU is not entirely passive. 
As far as Russia is concerned, at present its energy offensives at home and abroad are very aggres-
sive. Its future also seems to be promising in the context of a global energy shortage. However, I 
hold a cautious attitude toward the prospects of Russia’s gas diplomacy: Although there are many 
favorable factors, Russia should remain extremely cautious in its energy diplomacy including the 
handling of natural gas, because using oil and gas resources as a strategic weapon is a double-
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edged sword – it may be quite effective in the short term, but cannot possibly achieve strategic ob-
jectives in the long-term. 
History supports the idea that aggressive energy diplomacy will eventually backfire. In November 
1973, oil prices rose greatly after OPEC’s announcement of an oil embargo on the United States 
and the Netherlands, which made the Western world panic. The consequence was the Western 
countries reduced their dependence on oil by adopting energy efficiency measures and new tech-
nologies which ensured sustainable and healthy economic growth. In contrast Saudi Arabia and 
other OPEC countries conducted no adjustments to their economic structures after enjoying several 
years of huge profits, resulting in plummeting income per capita. 
At the time, the Soviet Union was in the Brezhnev era. The leaders of the Soviet Union had deter-
mined to reform the country’s economic structure, but the accidental rise in oil prices caused them 
to immediately switch attention to energy diplomacy. The Soviet Union supported the two oil cri-
ses and gained a lot of benefit from them: the Soviet Union successfully entered the oil industries 
of Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and other countries in the mid-1970s in the name of “aid”. At 
the end of 1973, right after the oil crisis took place, Iraq sold 6 million pounds’ worth of oil to the 
Soviet Union at a low price, to pay off the arms debts it owed from the anti-invasion war of Octo-
ber 1973. Before the shipment, the Soviet Union had already sold the oil to West Germany for 18 
million pounds.58 This sudden oil wealth hid serious economic difficulties in the Soviet Union. Oil 
exports enabled the Soviet Union’s extensive economic growth to continue and made political re-
form seem inappropriate.59 
The current international energy situation strikingly similar to that of the 1970s. Although the 
causes of energy crisis may differ, all countries in the world are facing high oil and gas prices, with 
the only difference that China, India and other emerging economies are experiencing more serious 
difficulties than the United States, Europe and other developed countries because they lack suffi-
cient energy reserves and diversified sources of imports.  
Compared to OPEC, the United States and European countries with large energy resources, Russia 
has a relative lack of experience in energy diplomacy. However, in the last two years it has tasted 
the benefits of such diplomacy. In the future, its use of energy as a weapon will become more fre-
quent. A Russian expert believes that the Nordic Gas Pipeline Project is a more effective tool of di-
plomacy than “the armed forces of the Soviet Union deployed in Germany in the past.”60 The 
Kremlin’s use of energy, especially natural gas resources, to control the CIS, split apart the EU and 
enter Asia has become obvious. Yet as it enjoys short-term economic and geopolitical benefits 
from natural gas diplomacy, it also assumes risks for the long term.  
As the history of OPEC and the former Soviet Union noted above, bulging coffers from oil dollars 
will weaken the government’s determination to reform its economic structure. The rapid growth of 
foreign exchange reserves will easily persuade political leaders that they have a powerful national 
economy. Such a faulty assessment of the economic situation will deprive leaders of the best timing 
for economic and political reforms, ultimately leading the country to become a “Middle East As-
similated” single energy exporter. Russia’s economy has shown a straight upward trend since 2001, 
but its excessive dependence on the export of raw materials, especially since the structure of oil and 
gas exports has not been changed, has aroused concerns from many people of insight, including 
Russian experts. 
Indeed, Russia plays a key role in the formation of pricing mechanisms in the global natural gas 
market. However, the rapid formation of a global natural gas market to a large extent depends on 
the possibility of creating a climate that can gain the confidence of investors who can provide huge 
amounts of financial and intellectual capital. In addition, the perfection of this market also relies on 
the large-scale construction of gas consumption terminals in the importing countries, which also 
requires substantial financial and human resources. Most of the studies have shown that despite 
abundant global natural gas resources, many reserves are located in countries with little or no tradi-
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tion of attracting private investors. The natural gas industry’s capital-intensive, long-term returns 
(15-20 years, some very complex projects need even longer) have made investors extremely cau-
tious in their decisions. Russia’s grim domestic political situation and the uncertainty of Russian 
foreign policies in the Putin era make the main gas-consuming countries in Europe and the United 
States unwilling to make large-scale investment decisions.61 
In order to safeguard its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union region, Russia has threat-
ened to cut off natural gas to its neighbors. In doing so, it has taken the oil and gas facilities of 
Moldova, Lithuania and other countries into its own energy transmission network. Moscow cur-
rently covets the gas pipelines in Ukraine. Although its diplomatic methods have strengthened Rus-
sia’s bargaining power in energy diplomacy, they have also deepened the Eastern European coun-
tries’ phobia about Russia, which has made the EU doubt Russia’s the reliability as a “guarantor of 
energy security”. Britain, France, Germany, Italy and other major EU member countries have be-
gun a revision of energy policy, setting the diversification imports and energy saving as their main 
objectives. In the long run, some of Russia’s energy diplomacy tactics will prove (and have proven) 
counterproductive. 
To achieve the dream of creating an energy empire, President Putin has implemented a series of 
iron-fisted policies, such as the suppression of domestic media, the appointment of Miller, 
Р.А.Медведев, Igor Sechin and other cronies as heads of state-owned energy enterprises. 
Р.А.Медведев is also charged with the first deputy prime minister’s responsibilities and is com-
monly recognized as one of the 2008 presidential candidates. At the end of 2005, at Putin’s behest 
the Duma adopted a bill that imposes restrictions on non-governmental organizations. Political 
measures of this kind have not only aroused concerns from the United States and Europe regarding 
Russia’s “democratization” process and energy diplomacy objectives but also caused the Russian 
people to have doubts about Russian domestic justice and freedom of speech. These latter conse-
quences in particular have greatly undermined the authority of the political bureaucracy and power-
ful groups, and even President Putin’s prestige. Meanwhile, the Putin government’s sustained pres-
sure through administrative means on Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky and Khodorkovsky 
and other oligarchs has caused panic among Russia’s rich and powerful, such that the transfer of 
assets has become inevitable. According to Russian Central Bank statistics, in 2004 the scale of 
leaked Russian capital was four times than that of the 2003, or 94 billion dollars. This data can be 
considered as demonstrating the worry of the Russian business community about the domestic eco-
nomic and political situation.62 
Overall, Russia’s huge energy reserves have granted it a unique strategic advantage. Fiona Hill, an 
expert on United States energy and Russian foreign policy and Senior Researcher on Foreign Poli-
cies Research Projects at the Brookings Institute, was correct in her assessment that although cur-
rently Russia is only a rising energy country, it will become the natural gas superpower within 20 
years.63 
Oil and gas could be both Russia’s most lethal weapons in the 21st century and the engine in the 
rejuvenation of its great power status. However, in view of the various risks in the implementation 
process of energy diplomacy, they may also be the trap that entombs Russia’s dream of rejuvena-
tion. The outcome depends on whether the Kremlin leader will be able to plan ahead and work out 
a more forward-looking strategy for domestic and foreign energy. 
The EU has its own way of coping with an aggressive Russia. Recently, EU foreign policy chief 
Javier Solana and EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner announced EU 
plans to carry out a series of diplomatic efforts to meet its growing energy needs. EU decision-
makers will make the assurance of oil and natural gas supply a top priority in EU foreign policy.64 
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EU governments must support the development and implementation of their domestic energy poli-
cies and solidify partnerships through joint actions with energy-exporting countries, including Rus-
sia. 
The EU’s measures to Russia’s energy diplomacy can generally be divided into the following cate-
gories: 
 
a) Signed extensive agreements on energy cooperation with Russia. 
 
The EU-Russia “Energy Community” concept developed by the EU was put on the agenda of 
global energy issues in the 1990s. The afore-mentioned controversial energy incidents that have 
occurred in the last two years have made a deep impression in this relatively new policy area. In the 
EU’s view, Russia’s current energy policies are both destabilizing and de-rationalizing oil and gas 
prices. The EU hopes that Russia will soon be able to guarantee the price and supply of natural gas, 
as well as sign the International Energy Charter. In turn, Russia expects the EU’s energy demand 
on Russia to continue for 10 to 20 years, with continued investment in energy exploration as a pre-
condition. Although Europe and Russia failed to sign an energy cooperation agreement at the Sam-
ara Summit due to poor political relations, the agreement is of self-evident importance to the both 
sides. Therefore, continued consultations and eventual agreement can be expected with certainty. 
 
b) Integration of the EU internal market to jointly deal with Russia 
 
In terms of the building of a unified internal energy market, the EU is still facing a small problem, 
which is mainly reflected in the conflict of energy interests among the EU countries and the differ-
ences in their respective energy policies. 
In the coordination of energy policy, the new energy strategy pointed out that the 27 EU member 
states should strengthen cross-border integration and regulation in the energy market, so as to form 
a unified internal energy market. In this regard, the EU Commission proposed “dismemberment” of 
a number of large energy enterprises for the decoupling of energy production and transmission. 
The EU leaders all agreed to analyze and adjust their respective national energy policies; actively 
support the construction of a Europe-wide energy network with the unified technical standards and 
specifications to further develop energy resources in the North and Caspian Seas; gradually break 
the monopoly of state-owned enterprises and select companies over the energy market to form a 
free market; and the formation of a single supply system for gas and electricity to ensure stable 
supply and demand as well as reasonable prices in the EU energy market. According to the plan, 
the electricity and gas markets in the EU countries would be completely open by July 2007. How-
ever, currently protectionism still exists in this field. Based on their own considerations, the differ-
ences of the EU countries on the liberalization of the energy market are still irreconcilable. Such a 
situation is obviously inconducive to the formation of a common EU energy policy.  
Recently, the EU has been worrying that the Putin government plans to merge the world’s largest 
natural gas company, Gazprom, with the Rosneft oil company. Such a merge reflects the Russian 
government’s consideration of trying to control the energy industry, which is clearly contrary to the 
EU’s expectation of free competition to ensure a stable energy supply. 
The EU also pays close attention to the Russian gas companies’ expansion attempts. The British 
Department of Trade and Industry has considered amending the relevant annexation bills to prevent 
Russian gas companies from taking over the British gas company. The German government also 
expressed support for the EU’s plan to formulate appropriate policies to reduce dependence on 
Russian energy. The German companies RWE and Eon are cooperative partners of the Russian 
Natural Gas Company. They have bought a large number of shares in the Russian Natural Gas 
Company and invested in the exploitation of Russian natural gas. Now the Russian Natural Gas 
Company in turn wants to buy shares in the German company in order to enter the German energy 
consumption market, which Germany and the EU do not want. Therefore, consolidating forces 
within the EU member states and reaching a consensus to jointly deal with Russia has become ur-
gent. 
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c) Energy cooperation and dialogues with energy importing countries to prevent Russia from rais-
ing prices. 
 
Brussels calls on EU member states to further strengthen cooperation and dialogue with other en-
ergy-consuming countries such as the United States, Japan, China and India. The EU is particularly 
alert to China’s intensive search for links with the global oil production countries to meet its grow-
ing energy needs as well as the global energy supply shortage caused by the rising energy con-
sumption of the United States. The EU is mainly worried that the global energy shortage will lead 
to higher energy prices, which may aggravate the price-pushing of energy exporting countries such 
as Russia. 
 
d) Development of alternative energy sources and improvement of energy efficiency to reduce en-
ergy dependence on Russia. 
 
The EU’s energy consumption breaks down as follows: roughly 40% oil, 23% natural gas, 16% nu-
clear energy, and 6% renewable energy. European countries have been trying to eliminate the nega-
tive effects of high oil prices on European economic development, but their efforts have had little 
success. Despite sharp oil output increases in the North Sea by Britain and Norway, the period re-
maining for exploitation is only five to eight years due to limited reserves. Dependence on OPEC 
oil and Russian energy is difficult to change. All these factors will lead to the EU’s further depend-
ence on Russian energy. Due to the energy supply and demand interdependence between the EU 
and Russia, unprecedented economic interdependence has occurred between the Atlantic and the 
Urals. Currently, the European economies have to rely on Russia’s energy supply. Germany, for 
instance, obtains 35% of its oil and 40% of its natural gas from Russia, more than any other country 
in Europe. Some experts predict that by 2020 these figures will reach 60% to 70%. Therefore, al-
ternative energy sources and improving energy efficiency have become a priority of EU energy 
policy, and even nuclear energy has become a somewhat attractive choice to avoid a Russian natu-
ral gas supply monopoly. 
Moreover, the EU can also impact on Russia’s energy policies through investment, technology 
transfers, environmental protection cooperation, and other means.  
In the last part of this chapter, let us take a look at the incidents that hve happened between Russia 
and Europe since 2006 in the field of energy: 
 
Summary of Europe-Russia energy relations since 2006  
 
Incident Time Content Conclusion 
Russia-Ukraine 
natural gas dispute 
01/2006 Price rises, natural gas cutoff(Market 
factors + ideology) 
Russia and Ukraine compromise; EU seeks 
diversified energy imports 
The EU Green Pa-
per 
03/2006 Sustainable development, competitive-
ness and supply security 
EU and Russia establish energy relations un-
der a legal framework 
The St. Petersburg 
G8 Summit 
7/2006 The Declaration of Global Energy Secu-
rity 
Russia and EU liberalize their energy markets; 
EU i expands investment in Russia 
Russia-Belarus 
energy dispute 
01/2007 Price rises, oil cutoff(Mainly market fac-
tors) 
Russia and Belarus comprise; EU doubts Rus-
sia’s reliability, common energy diplomacy is 
enhanced 
Putin’s visit to 
Turkmenistan & 
The Poland Energy 
Summit 
05/ 
11-13/ 
2007 
The Caspian Pipeline Construction & oil 
pipeline bypassing Russia (organization 
of anti-Russian energy alliance) 
Russia controls Central Asia’s main natural 
gas resources → Russia is still the key energy 
supplier to the EU 
The Samalaou 
Europe-Russia 
Summit 
05/18/ 
2007 
The discussion of new Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA); Energy 
cooperation, climate change, Russia’s 
entry into the WTO, etc. 
Partnership and cooperation agreements prove 
difficult, no progress in energy cooperation 
 
From the table it can be seen that after the Ukraine gas conflict in January 2006, the EU began to 
develop a new energy strategy toward Russia, emphasizing sustainable development, competitive-
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ness, supply security and the establishment of a legal framework for EU-Russia energy relations. 
At the St. Petersburg G8 Summit in July 2006, the EU also issued the Declaration on Global En-
ergy Security, which calls for Russia and Europe to both liberalize their energy markets, and the 
EU to expand investment in Russia. But in January 2007, at the outbreak of the Russia-Belarus en-
ergy conflict, the EU began to doubt Russia’s reliability. Although the incident ended in a com-
promise, it also highlighted the need to strengthen the common foreign energy policy. Therefore, in 
May 2007 the EU and Russia started to discuss the issue of energy pipeline construction, with the 
conclusion that Russia still has primary control of the Central Asian natural gas resources. This 
game indicated that the status of Russia as the EU’s main energy supplier will be difficult to shake 
in the near future. At the following Samalaou Europe-Russia Summit, Russia and Europe clearly 
showed mutual distrust and discontent. The extreme difficulties reaching a new partnership and co-
operation agreement has disabled the development of energy cooperation. Russia-Europe energy 
relations have reached a new low. 
The above difficulties are mainly due to political and economic changes on both sides, including 
Poland and Estonia’s conflict with Russia and, the rotation of leaders in France, Germany the 
United Kingdom and other major EU countries. Nevertheless, we can still assert that the Europe-
Russia energy relationship is merely experiencing a cyclical downturn, because their structures 
have not undergone fundamental changes. Russia-Europe energy interdependence remains.The po-
sition of the Russia-Europe geological space is more impossible to change. In the Post-Cold War 
Era or the so-called Post-Post-Cold War Era65, each country increasingly emphasizes economic or 
soft power competition. Many believe most contradictions and conflicts can be solved through ne-
gotiation, rather than a deadly game. In this era, “energy has become the currency of political and 
economic force; it is the decisive factor in the power hierarchy system among countries, even a 
new chip of success and material progress. Therefore, it has become a priority overriding every-
thing to obtain energy in the 21st century.”66 In other words, energy has become the key issue in 
the field of contemporary international politics, an important pillar of inter-state relations in the 
present era. Under this background, even the great differences on energy issues between Russia and 
Europe are not irreconcilable. We can see that even at the lowest point of mutual relations the en-
ergy trade has not been permanently affected. 
Europe’s reliance on Russian energy is unlikely to change any time soon, while Russia’s largest 
importer of energy is Europe. If Russia loses this market it will mean the loss of a source of huge 
funds. In such an interdependent relationship the unilateral use of energy weapons or energy sanc-
tions will cause great harm to the EU as well as Russia. Thus, unless some structural changes occur 
in Europe-Russia energy relations such as the success of Russia’s development of its energy distri-
bution system in the Far East region or the EU’s success in finding new alternative energies that 
ensure huge production, the Europe-Russia energy relationship will not be too much affected by 
political considerations. 
From the perspective of the European geopolitical pattern, the EU is an ally of the United States but 
also maintains a partnership with Russia, with which it shares the European continent. The EU 
definitely will not simply follow the United States in confronting Russia. By studying the EU’s 
Green Paper on energy and Russia’s Energy Strategy before 2020, we can conclude that there are 
no fundamental conflicts between EU and Russian economic interests. The current problems are 
now more political than economic. Therefore, the EU’s energy diplomacy toward Russia should 
focus on long-term strategic relationship while paying close attention to energy resources. 
Finally, I would like to quote one sentence from EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs as the 
conclusion of this chapter. “Russia and Europe need each other in the energy sector..The energy 
products the EU purchases from Russia are the key to Russian economic recovery while a stable, 
reasonably priced energy supply is also an important economic development engine for the EU. In 
this area, in other words, we are mutually reinforcing.”67 
                                                     
65  Ralph A. Cossa, “Opening up the Post-post- Cold War Era”, Korea Times, 12 October 2001. 
66  Paul Roberts, The End of Oil, Chinese translation, Wu Jinglian, ed., (Beijing: CITIC Publishing House, 2005), 
p.159-160. 
67  Andris Piebalgss, Commissioner on Energy of the European Commission, speech at International Energy Week in 
Moscow, 30 October 2006. 
